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Abstract: We examine geographical concentration, scientific quality, and editorial favoritism 
in the field of experimental economics. We use a novel data set containing all original research 
papers (𝑁 = 596) that exclusively used laboratory experiments for data generation and were 
published in the American Economic Review, Experimental Economics, or the Journal of the 
European Economic Association between 1998 and 2018. The development of geographical 
concentration is examined using data on authors' affiliations at the time of the respective 
publication. Results show that research output produced by US-affiliated economists increased 
slower than overall research output, leading to a decrease in geographical concentration. 
Several proxies for scientific quality indicate that experiments conducted in Europe are of 
higher quality than experiments conducted in North America: European experiments rely on a 
larger total number of participants as well as participants per treatment, and receive more 
citations compared to experiments conducted in North America. Examining laboratory 
experiments published in the AER more closely, we find that papers authored by economists 
with US-affiliations receive significantly fewer citations in the first 5 and 10 years after 
publication compared to papers by authors from the rest of the world.  
 
JEL classification: A11, A14, C90, I23  
Keywords: laboratory experiments, favoritism, geographical concentration, methodological 
standards, network effects, gender effects 
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1 Introduction 
Several studies on publications in academic top journals show a dominant position of US 
research. An important question is whether this dominance is the product of the sheer size of 
the US, of discrimination, or of other barriers to entry for researchers from the rest of the world. 
In the last decades, research on geographical and institutional concentration has received a lot 
of attention. For economic top journals, several studies show that a large but declining share of 
research is produced by US-based economists (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Glötzl and Aigner 
2019, Kocher and Sutter 2001, Kalaitzidakis et al. 1999, Hodgson and Rothman 1999, Elliott 
et al. 1998, Frey and Pommerehne 1988).  
In this paper, we focus on one particular field: experimental economics. Our analyses cover all 
laboratory experiments published between 1998 and 2018 in three important journals: the 
American Economic Review (AER), arguably one of the top journals for general economics 
worldwide, Experimental Economics (Exp Econ), the top field journal, and the Journal of the 
European Economic Association (JEEA), arguably the European top journal for general 
economics. 
Our first contribution is an analysis of geographical concentration. We examine its development 
using data on authors' affiliations at the time of publication. Similar to previous work, our 
analysis reveals that although the US still has a dominant position, its dominance has decreased 
over time.  
As a second contribution, we examine the gender composition of authors. We find that less than 
20% of the total number of authors in our data set are women. More than 60% of the papers in 
our data set were written solely by male authors. For the field of experimental economics we 
do not observe an increase in the relative share of female authors. These observations are very 
similar to the results of a recent study by Hengel and Moon (2020) who consider a much larger 
number of papers from economic top journals. 
Our third contribution is an analysis of several proxies capturing the scientific quality of the 
published experiments. Drawing on the literature on experimental methods, we identify four 
proxies that are indicative of the quality of laboratory experiments and which can be determined 
by the experimenters: the total number of participants, the number of participants per treatment, 
the number of treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives (measured as real 2015-USD 
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per average participant-minute). To ensure comparability between experiments, we restrict our 
analyses to laboratory experiments and exclude all other types of experiments. 
Our results show substantial differences between Europe and North America, the two regions 
where more than 80% of the experiments were conducted. For all three journals, experiments 
conducted in Europe have a larger number of participants per treatment. In the AER and in Exp 
Econ, experiments conducted in Europe also have a larger total number of participants. We find 
no differences in the strength of monetary incentives. Hence, the (inflation-adjusted) total costs 
of experiments are higher for experiments conducted in Europe. 
Our fourth contribution is to test whether the dominance of US-affiliated economists on the 
editorial board of the AER gives rise to editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism can be a serious 
problem for scientific progress (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a). 
It arises when editorial decisions are not exclusively based on scientific criteria but also on non-
scientific criteria, such as authors' institutional connections: if non-scientific criteria influence 
editorial decisions, colleagues with social ties to the members of a small elite of editors will 
find it "easier" to get their papers accepted. Such favoritism is a problem when the quality of 
published research suffers from it, i.e., when the papers from editors’ buddies are published 
while better papers by other scholars are rejected.  
Unlike the existing literature (Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a), 
our analysis of editorial favoritism clusters groups by geographical regions (US and Europe) 
and not by individual institutions (e.g., universities). As we lack data on submissions, we focus 
on published papers. In the presence of editorial favoritism, we expect papers from authors 
without social ties to the editors to be of higher average quality than papers from authors with 
social ties to the editors. 
In our analyses of possible editorial favoritism, we also control for the gender composition of 
author teams. In recent papers, Card et al. (2020) and Hengel and Moon (2020) found that 
female-authored papers receive more citations than male-authored papers. Here, we are able to 
analyze whether such a gender citation premium also exists in the field of experimental 
economics. We confirm this finding for the AER and the JEEA, albeit the effect not reaching 
statistical significance in all specifications. 
The number of participants and treatments, and the strength of monetary incentives constitute 
a set of ex ante proxies for quality that are available to editors when deciding about publication. 
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However, originality, timeliness, and practical relevance are also strongly related to a paper's 
quality, but are not captured by our proxies for quality. Therefore, we use the number of 
citations that a paper received in the 5 and 10 years after publication as an ex post proxy for 
quality. Assuming that editors exclusively aim to maximize their journal's impact factor (which 
is debatable, but see Card and DellaVigna 2020), there should be no systematic difference in 
the quality of papers authored by economists with and without affiliations on the editorial 
board’s continent. However, this is not always the case. We find that AER papers (co-)authored 
by economists with a US affiliation receive, on average, fewer citations in the 5 and 10 years 
following publication compared to papers by European authors published in the same outlet. 
This pattern was not found for papers published in Exp Econ and the JEEA, suggesting that the 
AER’s selection criteria for research based on laboratory experiments fail to maximize the 
journal’s impact factor, or that editors pursue other goals1. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study in which the quality of laboratory 
experiments is compared across journals and geographical regions. By incorporating 
objectively measurable quality proxies into our analysis, we shed some light on the question of 
to what extent (differences in) citations are driven by (differences in) quality characteristics, 
social ties, and gender. In this respect, our analysis goes beyond the existing work on editorial 
favoritism. Surprisingly, and despite the large differences in the total number of participants 
and participants per treatment, we find no robust evidence for any effect of these quality proxies 
on the number of citations. Yet, we are confident that our results provide insights for editors on 
how to improve their journals’ selection criteria and to increase their journals' impact factors. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the related literature 
in section 2. In section 3, we describe our data set and our selection criteria for journals and 
papers before we examine geographical concentration and the gender composition of authors 
in section 4. In section 5, we compare laboratory experiments conducted in Europe and North 
America using our proxies for quality. We describe our tests for editorial favoritism in section 
6 and conclude in section 7. 
                                                     
1 We decided to focus on editors and not on referees for three reasons. First, editors have the power to overrule 
referees' suggestions. Second, editors tend to select referees to whom they have easy access, implying that social 
ties between author and editor and between author and referee are correlated (Hamermesh 1994). And third, data 
on referees is hard to obtain (an exception is Card et al. (2020)). 
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2  Related Literature 
2.1 Geographical Concentration 
Kalaitzidakis et al. (1999) look at ten high-quality economics journals from 1991 to 1996 and 
show that between 69% and 90% of all authors have an affiliation in North America. Based on 
all papers in 15 top economics journals between 1977 and 1997, Kocher und Sutter (2001) find 
that 72.2% of these papers were authored by economists working in the US. They also find that 
US dominance reduced over time. Ek and Henrekson (2019) look at the top-five economics 
journals and reveal that between 82% (in 1994) and 65% (in 2017) of all authors have an 
affiliation in North America, and 95% of the North American authors have their affiliation in 
the US. Other studies find similar results regarding the decline in US dominance (Glötzl and 
Aigner 2019, Neary et al. 2003)2. For the field of laboratory experiments, we expect a similar 
pattern. 
2.2 Social Ties and Editorial Favoritism 
Editorial favoritism occurs when it is easier for an economist with a social tie to one or more 
editors to get her paper accepted, compared to a paper of the same quality submitted by an 
economist without such a social tie. Editorial favoritism might occur if, for example, editors 
favor their former PhD students, or authors employed at the same university or the same region3.  
A relatively high share of papers by authors who are connected to one of the journal's editors is 
often taken as an indication for editorial favoritism. However, this is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. As pointed out by Brogaard et al. (2014, 252), the decisive question is “…whether 
editors use information advantages to improve selection decisions, or whether they bow to 
conflicts of interest.” 
                                                     
2 US dominance can be observed not only among authors but also among editors. Hodgson and Rothman (1999, 
168 - 170) look at the top 30 economics journals and show that more than 83% of all editorial board members are 
from the US. In section 6.1, we describe the composition of the editorial boards for the journals we examined. 
3 Discrimination implies that papers with a lower quality are accepted for publication, while papers with a higher 
quality are rejected. If the paper's true quality is somehow revealed after publication (possibly, by the number of 
citations), this might damage a journal's reputation (a loss in the journal's impact factor). So how can discrimination 
persist? It can persist as long as the true quality is not revealed, or if there is a form of collusion between editors 
of different journals, who all discriminate in the same way. In experimental oligopoly markets, it has been found 
that a shrinking market facilitates collusion (Abbink and Brandts 2009). In economics, we have a similar situation. 
As more and more journals are being published in English but outside the US (e.g., the JEEA), the US-market is 
shrinking. However, rather than investigating discrimination over time, we focus on the possible existence of 
discrimination in one particular field. 
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The earliest study on editorial favoritism in economics by Laband and Piette (1994a) analyzes 
all papers published in 28 top economics journals in the year 1984. Laband and Piette define a 
social tie as one of the authors and one member of the editorial board having received their PhD 
from the same university or one of the authors and one member of the editorial board being 
affiliated with the same university in 1984. Controlling for papers’ length, journal quality, 
author's age, gender, and reputation, they find a positive correlation between the number of 
citations in the 5 years after publication and the existence of a social tie. They note that few 
well-cited high-quality papers mainly drive this positive correlation. However, their results also 
show that economists who had social ties to the editors authored more than two thirds of the 
papers with remarkably few citations. Thus, Laband and Piette find no clear evidence in favor 
of or against editorial favoritism. Based on their results, they conclude that "on balance, journal 
editors use their professional connections to search out good papers, rather than print 
substandard material written by their colleagues or buddies" (Laband and Piette 1994a, 200). 
Medoff (2003) analyzes all papers published in six top economics journals in 1990 and also 
finds that papers by authors with a social tie to the editors or co-editors receive a higher number 
of citations in the years following publication. He examines the citations received in the 5 and 
10 years after publication and observes that the positive effect of social ties is stable over time. 
More recently, several papers have examined further effects of social ties. Based on an analysis 
of 50,000 articles in 30 major economics and finance journals since 1955, Brogaard et al. (2014) 
find that the publication rates of authors in these journals increase by 100% as soon as one of 
their current colleagues is the editor in charge of the corresponding journal. Their results show 
that articles by authors with social ties to editors receive significantly more citations than 
articles by authors without such connections. Colussi (2018) analyzes all 1,620 papers 
published in four top-journals (AER, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, and the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics) between 2000 and 2006. Colussi’s results show that editors 
are more likely to accept papers from colleagues (an 8% increase at the baseline) and former 
PhD students (a 14% increase at the baseline). Further, he shows that about 43% of all papers 
were written by an author connected to at least one editor in charge of the journal at the time of 
publication. However, since the base-rate of submitting authors is unknown, this value is 
difficult to interpret. Heckman (2017) finds a similar pattern in two house journals, the 
University of Chicago's Journal of Political Economy and Harvard's Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Using data on publications from 2000 to 2016, he shows that 14.3% of all papers 
in the Journal of Political Economy come from authors affiliated with the University of 
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Chicago, and 24.7% of all publications in the Quarterly Journal of Economics stem from 
authors affiliated with Harvard.  
Taken together, the results from previous studies suggest that (1) social ties can improve the 
chances of getting published because they reduce editors’ search costs for high-quality papers, 
and (2) that conditional on being accepted for publication, on average, papers from authors with 
social ties receive more citations. None of the studies finds clear evidence for editorial 
favoritism (but see Shepherd 1995, for anecdotal evidence). 
The studies discussed above focus on editorial favoritism and the effects of social ties. They 
discuss social ties exclusively at the institutional level but not at the regional level. Frey and 
Pommerehne (1988, 106-107) point out that it may also generally be easier for American 
economists to publish in American-dominated journals as opposed to non-American 
economists. 
Studies on editorial favoritism (Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a) use data on individual 
authors (e.g., affiliations, age, gender, reputation) and characteristics of the papers (e.g., length, 
JEL code, position within the journal issue). These characteristics, however, are not related to 
any methodological standards. In section 5.1, we argue that there are four proxies that capture 
different methodological standards for laboratory experiments. Our analysis of editorial 
favoritism for laboratory experiments includes these four proxies, and thus extends the existing 
literature on editorial favoritism. 
2.3 Gender Effects 
The primary interest of our paper is to investigate the geographical concentration of authors 
and possible signs of editorial favoritism in the field of laboratory experimental economics. In 
light of a growing literature addressing the underrepresentation of women in economics (i.e., 
Lundberg and Stearns 2019, Bayer and Rouse 2016) and finding quality-relevant gender effects 
(Card et al. 2020, Hengel and Moon 2020, Hengel 2019), we investigate the effect of an authors’ 
gender on an articles’ quality in this article as well. Below, we briefly address the main findings 
of recent studies that examine the influence of the authors’ gender on the ex ante and ex post 
quality of articles4. 
                                                     
4 For more detailed explanations of these gender effects, we recommend the studies by Card et al. (2020) and 
Hengel (2019). 
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Analyzing the readability scores of abstracts of more than 9,000 articles published in four of 
the top-5 economics journals, Hengel (2019) finds that female authored articles have a higher 
writing quality than male authored articles. Her results show that the gender gap in readability 
scores increases from the working paper to the published paper. This suggests that stricter 
requirements are imposed on female authors during the review process. In line with this result, 
for Econometrica papers, Hengel observes that peer review for female-authored papers takes 
on average six months longer. She therefore concludes that editors demand higher quality 
standards from female authors. In a follow-up paper, Hengel and Moon (2020) use citation data 
of more than 11,000 papers published in the top-5 economics journals5 to examine whether the 
authors’ gender affects the number of citations a paper has received in the years after 
publication. Controlling for authors’ reputation, number of authors, JEL code, and journal-year 
fixed effects, their results show that female authored papers receive more citations than male 
authored papers. Hengel’s and Moon’s results also illustrate that male authors’ citations 
increase when they co-author with female authors while female authors’ citations decrease 
when they co-author with male authors. 
Card et al. (2020) examine the relationships between the gender of authors and referees, the 
referee recommendations, the decisions of editors, and the citations a paper receives. Using data 
from nearly 30,000 papers submitted to the JEEA, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the 
Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Review of Economic Studies, and controlling for 
the respective field and authors’ reputation they find that female-authored papers receive 25% 
more citations than male-authored papers. They further find evidence that editors, irrespective 
of referees’ and authors’ gender, largely follow the recommendations of their referees. Card et 
al. argue that editors are gender-blind and that both female and male referees are equally likely 
to set higher standards for female authors.  
3 Data on Laboratory Experiments 
3.1 Selection Criteria 
Although we are interested in the broad field of experimental economics, we decided to focus 
exclusively on papers that report results from laboratory experiments. Precisely, we focus on 
laboratory experiments that generate data in a controlled process using student participants who 
                                                     
5 The journals included in Hengel (2019) are the AER, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, and the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Hengel and Moon (2020) additionally include articles from the Review of 
Economic Studies. 
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interact in an artificial environment6. In order to ensure the greatest possible comparability, we 
do not consider papers that contain other types of experiments7. 
For laboratory experiments, objectively measurable proxies for an experiment’s quality exist. 
This is because, compared to field experiments, laboratory experiments have the exclusive 
advantage that the experimenter has a high degree of control. Proxies for an experiment's quality 
are the total number of participants, the number of treatments, the number of participants per 
treatment, and the strength of monetary incentives. We describe these proxies in more detail in 
section 5.1.  
There is no doubt that field experiments play an important role in experimental economics (for 
a detailed discussion see Czibor et al. 2019, Carpenter et al. 2005, Harrison and List 2004). 
However, in field experiments, at least one of our quality proxies is out of the experimenter’s 
control. For example, an artefactual field (or lab-in-the-field) experiment relies on a population 
of participants specifically selected for a given research question (e.g., chess players in Bühren 
et al. 2012 and Levitt et al. 2011) that cannot be fully controlled by the experimenter. Similarly, 
framed field experiments take place in a natural environment (e.g., the National Rural Support 
Programme Offices in Afzal et al. 2017) which also cannot be fully controlled by the 
experimenter. In natural field experiments, moreover, both the participant population and the 
environment cannot be controlled exogenously. 
3.2 Our Data Set 
Our data set contains 596 papers published between 1998 and 2018 (410 from Exp Econ, 145 
from the AER (including papers from AER’s Papers and Proceedings8), and 41 from the 
JEEA)9. We chose 1998 as the starting year for our analysis because Exp Econ was founded 
that year. Exp Econ is the specialized field journal of the Economic Science Association. It 
publishes laboratory and field experiments as well as related theoretical papers and reviews. 
We chose the AER and the JEEA because they are the official journals of the American 
Economic Association and the European Economic Association, respectively. Both are general 
                                                     
6 Our data contain papers where the majority of the participants were students. Papers where a large share of 
participants belonged to special groups (such as job professionals or caste members) are not included in the data 
set. 
7 For example, the AER paper by Imas (2016) is not included in our data set because the paper contains two 
laboratory experiments and a robustness check conducted online via Amazon M-Turk. 
8 Since 2018, the AEA Papers and Proceedings are available as an independent journal. Our data set contains only 
those papers from Papers and Proceedings that were published in the May issue of the AER in the years before 
2018. 
9 A full list of the included papers can be found in the supplementary material. 
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interest journals and publish only a small share of laboratory experiments10. We have decided 
to collect data from these relatively high ranked journals to ensure that the individual papers 
have received a certain number of citations and because we assume that these journals receive 
a high number of submissions from different geographical regions. 
For each paper in our data set, we collected data on: 
 the authors and their affiliations at the time of publication, 
 the number of female authors, 
 the number of citations received by the individual authors in the 5 years before 
publication, 
 the total number of pages, 
 the total number of references, 
 the journal's impact factors in the year the paper was published, and  
 the paper's number of citations in the 5 and 10 years after publication. 
In addition, we extracted data on the characteristics of the laboratory experiments reported in 
the papers. If available, for each laboratory experiment we collected data on: 
 the total number of participants, 
 the number of treatments, 
 the duration of the experiment, 
 average earnings per participant, and 
 the year in which the experiment was conducted. 
Citation data was obtained from Web of Science. Data on impact factors were taken from CitEc, 
a RePEc service that provides citation data for economics11. In line with Hengel and Moon 
(2020), we determined an author's gender either by clearly gendered first names, by 
photographs on university or personal websites, or by personal pronouns used in texts about the 
author.  All other data were obtained directly from the published papers. Since not all papers 
report data on all characteristics, our data set contains some papers for which some or all of the 
                                                     
10 On the IDEAS/RePEc list of Simple Impact Factors for Journals, the AER is ranked 10th, the JEEA is ranked 
19th and Exp Econ is ranked 35th (see https://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html, accessed August 29 
2019). On the latest version of the Journal Quality List of Anne-Wil Harzing, which provides an overview of 
several different ratings, the AER is rated A+ and the JEEA and Exp Econ are both rated A (see 
https://harzing.com/download/jql_title_2019-02.pdf, accessed August 29 2019). 
11 For the AER see, http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/aeaaecrev.html, for Exp Econ see, 
http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/kapexpeco.html and for the JEEA see, http://citec.repec.org/s/2018/blajeurec.html 
(accessed July 9, 2019). Data for Exp Econ's impact factor for 1998 and for the JEEA's impact factor before 
2011 was not available. 
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experiment's characteristics are missing. In case of missing values, we tried to obtain the data 
from working paper versions or directly from the authors, which was successful in some cases. 
4 Geographical Concentration and Gender Composition in Experimental 
Economics 
In this section, we examine the geographical concentration of published laboratory experiments 
at the country-level and the gender composition of author teams. In section 4.1, we look at 
country shares for each journal for the longest available period. In section 4.2, we examine how 
geographical concentration has changed over time. In section 4.3, we scrutinize the gender 
composition of author teams in our dataset and compare it between the three journals. 
We measure geographical concentration as follows (see also Combes and Linnemer 2003, 
Kocher und Sutter 2001). Let 𝐼𝐹𝑖 be the 2-year impact factor of the journal in which paper 𝑖 
was published in the respective publishing year. Let 𝑛𝑖 be the number of authors of paper 𝑖. An 
author's weight is then given by 𝐼𝐹𝑖/𝑛𝑖. The weighted score for a single country and a given 
time period is calculated by aggregating the values of all authors whose affiliated institution 
was located in this country (at the time of publication). Given the weighted scores of all 
countries, we compute each country's share. 
4.1 Pooled Over Time 
Table 1 shows the shares for selected countries12. The first three columns depict the results by 
journal while the last column presents the aggregate results for laboratory experiments 
published in all three journals. Table 15 (appendix A) lists all countries' scores and shares by 
journal. Our results remain qualitatively similar when individual papers are not weighted by the 
journal's impact factor but rather assigning each author a weight of 1/𝑛𝑖. 
  
                                                     
12 We have assigned Israel, Russia and Turkey to Europe and Guatemala and Mexico to North America throughout 
the whole paper. 
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Shares 
AER Exp Econ JEEA all three 
Austria 2.63 4.86 0.00 3.60 
France 0.65 3.03 2.94 2.20 
Germany 4.41 12.08 13.29 9.57 
Israel 1.48 0.84 0.00 0.98 
Italy 0.39 3.50 1.55 2.24 
Netherlands 3.30 4.68 7.35 4.47 
Norway 0.54 0.68 6.31 1.20 
Spain 2.68 5.88 2.04 4.40 
Sweden 0.71 1.25 0.00 0.94 
Switzerland 5.01 2.24 20.05 4.98 
UK 6.08 8.80 9.50 7.94 
Other European countries 0.78 1.89 0.00 1.36 
Europe 28.65 49.73 63.03 43.82 
US 63.33 37.84 29.58 45.77 
Other North American countries 1.79 3.06 1.53 2.47 
North America 65.11 40.90 31.11 48.24 
Australia and NZ 2.41 4.99 2.07 3.81 
Asia 3.32 4.09 2.65 3.68 
South America 0.50 0.29 1.15 0.45 
Other continents 6.23 9.37 5.87 7.94 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table 1: Geographical concentration, countries' relative shares for selected countries, pooled data from 1998 to 
2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 2018 for Exp Econ and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA. Continents are marked 
in bold. 
We see that US economists are dominant in all journals, with this dominance being most 
pronounced for the AER. When looking at the European countries, Germany, the UK, 
Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria stand out because they have the highest 
outputs within Europe. 
4.2 Development Over Time 
Looking at the development over time, we divide the 20-year period from 1999 to 2018 into 
four five-year periods13. Table 2 presents the scores and shares of all countries with a share 
larger than 1% (for the whole period from 1999 to 2018). Scores and shares of all countries can 
be found in appendix A Table 16. The analyses in Table 2 and Table 16 only contain data on 
papers from the AER and Exp Econ, as CitEc impact factors for the JEEA are only available 
for 2011-2018. 
The first result that sticks out is the sharp increase in the field's research output. Looking at the 
total output by aggregating scores over all countries (Table 2 and appendix A, Table 16), we 
see an increase from 108.50 (1999-2003) to 282.86 (2004-2008) to 608.36 (2009-2013) 
                                                     
13 We exclude observations from 1998, as CitEc impact factors for Exp Econ are only available from 1999 onward. 
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followed by a decrease to 422.38 (2014-2018). The decrease in the most recent period could be 
due to four reasons: first, field and online experiments have developed into an increasingly 
established research method in recent years (see e.g., Stewart et al. 2015), partially replacing 
lab experiments14. Second, a larger fraction of papers use multiple methods for data collection 
which are not included in our data set. Third, other journals may have become more open toward 
laboratory experiments or new journals that publish laboratory experiments have been 
established. And fourth, editors' tastes may have changed so that other research methods are 
preferred to laboratory experiments. 
Based on the scores (appendix A, Table 16), we computed compound growth rates. Aggregated 
over all countries, the field's research output increased by 57.31% from each five-year period 
to the next. As expected, the compound growth rate for US-economists is much smaller 
(29.51%). High growth rates are observed for Australia (211%), Austria (192%), Italy (157%), 
China (133%), Germany (118%), the UK (122%), the Netherlands (110%), and Japan (100%). 
Of course, these growth rates are partly due to the fact that some countries started from very 
low levels of research output in the period 1999-2003. 
  
                                                     
14 This is similar to the results in Nikiforakis and Slonim (2019). They show that the share of published field 
experiments in the top-5 journals increased steadily until 2015, but has been decreasing since then. For the periods 
2009-2010 to 2017-2018, they report a 66% drop in published laboratory experiments in the top-5 journals.  
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Shares 
Scores 
1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018 1999-2018 
Austria 0.61 0.12 6.53 3.98 3.99 
  0.67 0.34 39.71 16.63 57.34 
France 2.93 0.19 2.51 2.68 2.11 
  3.18 0.55 15.27 11.33 30.33 
Germany 4.66 5.46 9.50 12.47 9.13 
  5.06 15.43 57.80 52.66 131.28 
Israel 1.05 0.77 1.72 0.43 1.15 
  1.13 2.18 10.44 1.82 16.58 
Italy 0.60 1.22 2.94 2.63 2.34 
  0.65 3.44 17.91 11.09 33.60 
Netherlands 2.27 4.15 3.67 5.42 4.13 
  2.46 11.73 20.30 22.88 59.38 
Spain 1.66 2.77 8.13 1.80 4.66 
  1.80 7.85 49.46 7.59 67.02 
Sweden 0.99 1.68 0.23 1.84 1.04 
  1.07 4.74 1.37 7.76 14.95 
Switzerland 8.96 1.29 4.31 1.81 3.28 
  9.72 3.64 26.24 7.64 47.24 
UK 3.00 6.45 8.86 8.46 7.83 
  3.25 18.24 53.93 35.72 112.64 
Other Euro. countries 1.74 0.73 1.14 2.37 1.45 
 1.89 2.07 6.95 10.01 20.92 
Europe 28.47 25.86 49.54 45.25 41.73 
 30.89 73.16 301.38 191.13 600.22 
US 65.92 68.88 41.17 36.79 47.55 
  71.52 194.84 250.48 155.38 683.91 
Other NA countries 1.55 0.87 3.05 3.35 2.59 
 1.68 2.46 18.57 14.14 37.18 
North America 67.46 69.75 44.23 40.13 50.14 
  73.20 197.3 269.05 169.52 721.09 
Australia and NZ 2.28 1.55 4.41 5.69 3.99 
 2.48 4.39 26.84 23.63 57.33 
Asia 1.79 2.83 1.72 7.92 3.78 
 1.94 8.01 10.45 33.47 54.33 
South America 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.10 0.37 
 0.00 0.00 0.64 4.63 5.27 
Other continents 4.07 4.38 6.24 14.61 8.14 
 4.42 12.40 37.93 61.73 116.93 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 108.50 282.86 608.36 422.38 1438.26 
Table 2: Shares and scores for the geographical concentration of AER and Exp Econ authors for selected 
countries. Data pooled over different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the 
second row reports the country's score. 
Looking at countries' relative shares (the upper row of each country in Table 2 and Table 16), 
we find that the US-dominance decreased from about 65.92% (1999-2003) to 36.79% (2014-
2018) while several countries increased their relative shares. The countries that gained most are 
Germany (7.81%), the UK (5.46%), Australia (4.38%), Austria (3.32%), and the Netherlands 
(3.15%). These results imply that geographical concentration has decreased. Indeed, this is 
15 
 
confirmed if we look at the Herfindahl index15 which first increased from 0.337 (1999-2003) to 
0.485 (2004-2008) but then decreased to 0.181 (2009-2013) and to 0.171 (2014-2018). In sum, 
our data show that, for laboratory experimental economics, the geographical concentration of 
AER and Exp Econ authors has substantially decreased. 
The discussion above focused on the development of impact-weighted research output. Note 
that we looked at output (i.e., published papers in only two journals) without considering inputs 
(e.g., manpower, financial resources). Hence, we cannot say anything about a country's 
productivity. Because input data comparable across countries is not available, we follow 
Kocher and Sutter (2001) in using a country's population as proxy and compute each country's 
output per million inhabitants in Table 17 and Table 18 (appendix A)16. 
Considering the first time period (1999-2003, see Table 17), we see that output per million 
inhabitants was below 0.2, except for Switzerland (1.36), New Zealand (0.46), and the US 
(0.26). Considering only the last period (2014-2018, see appendix A, Table 18), we see that 
output was above 0.40 for several countries (Australia 0.90, Germany 0.65, UK 0.55, US 0.49) 
and that productivity was very high in some small countries (Austria 1.95, Singapore 1.40, the 
Netherlands 1.36, Norway 1.17, Switzerland 0.93, Denmark 0.83, Sweden 0.80, New Zealand 
0.53). 
Interestingly, there are some differences between our results and the results reported in Kocher 
and Sutter (2001, 414). According to their results, Israel has the highest and the US have the 
second-highest productivity. UK ranks third, Switzerland ranks 9th, Germany ranks 17th, and 
Spain ranks 19th. Recall that while Kocher and Sutter consider papers from all areas, we focus 
on laboratory experimental economics. In addition, Kocher and Sutter include data until 1997 
while our data on geographical concentration starts from 1999. Because of the different time 
periods and our specialization on one particular field, the results are not directly comparable. 
                                                     
15 The Herfindahl index is the sum of all countries' squared market shares. For a monopoly, the index is equal to 
one. Smaller numbers indicate less concentration. 
16 This approach only gives a crude picture and has several shortcomings (c.f. Kocher and Sutter 2001, 414). It 
implicitly assumes that resources devoted to experimental economics is highly correlated with a country's number 
of inhabitants which is problematic especially in large, less-developed countries. Data for population sizes was 
taken from the World Bank (see, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/1ff4a498/Popular-
Indicators, accessed May 22, 2019) and for Taiwan from the UN (see, 
https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/, accessed May 22, 2019). To compute scores per 
million inhabitants for a specific time period we used the population size for the period's first year (e.g., 1999 
population for the period 1999-2003). 
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Yet, a tentative explanation for the differences is that several European countries (Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands) have specialized in experimental economics. 
4.3 Gender Composition of Author Teams 
The 596 papers in our data set were written by a total of 1498 authors. 282 (18.83%) of these 
authors are female. Table 3 depicts the gender composition by the number of authors per paper. 
For all numbers of authors, the proportion of papers written solely by male authors is more than 
50%. 
number of 
authors 
1 2 3 >3 all 
papers 𝑁 = 71 𝑁 = 246 𝑁 = 197 𝑁 = 82 𝑁 = 596 
solely female 
authored papers 
𝑁 = 21 
29.58% 
𝑁 = 11 
4.47% 
𝑁 = 2 
1.02% 
𝑁 = 0 
0.00% 
𝑁 = 34 
5.70% 
solely male 
authored papers 
𝑁 = 50 
70.42% 
𝑁 = 151 
61.38% 
𝑁 = 121 
61.42% 
𝑁 = 41 
50.00% 
𝑁 = 363 
60.91% 
mixed gender 
authored papers 
- 𝑁 = 84 
34.15% 
𝑁 = 74 
37.56% 
𝑁 = 41 
50.00% 
𝑁 = 199 
33.39% 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics on the gender composition of author teams by number of authors per paper. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on the gender composition of authors for each of the three 
journals. Across all journals, the share of papers written solely by female authors is only 5.70%. 
With 33.39%, the share of papers with at least one female author is much higher. Across all 
papers and journals, the average of the relative share of female authors is 20.16%. From 1998 
to 2018, no clear trend can be identified for the relative share of female authors (see appendix 
A, Figure 3). Our results are comparable to those of Hengel and Moon (2020) who observe 
only a marginal increase in the percentage share of female authors for papers published since 
1990 (11%) and 2010 (14%). In our data set, the relative shares of female authors do not differ 
between the journals (two-sample Mann-Whitney tests, all p-values > 0.1).     
 AER Exp Econ JEEA all three 
authors 𝑁 = 370 𝑁 = 1013 𝑁 = 115 𝑁 = 1498 
female authors 
 
𝑁 = 60 
16.22% 
𝑁 = 204 
20.14% 
𝑁 = 18 
15.65% 
𝑁 = 282 
18.83% 
male authors 
 
𝑁 = 310 
83.78% 
𝑁 = 809 
79.86% 
𝑁 = 97 
84.35% 
𝑁 = 1216 
81.17% 
papers 𝑁 =145 𝑁 = 410 𝑁 =41 𝑁 =596 
solely female authored 
papers 
𝑁 = 6 
4.14% 
𝑁 = 27 
6.59% 
𝑁 = 1 
2.44% 
𝑁 = 34 
5.70% 
solely male authored papers 𝑁 = 95 
65.52% 
𝑁 = 240 
58.54% 
𝑁 = 28 
68.29% 
𝑁 = 363 
60.91% 
mixed gender authored 
papers 
𝑁 = 44 
30.34% 
𝑁 = 143 
34.88% 
𝑁 = 12 
29.27% 
𝑁 = 199 
33.39% 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics on the gender composition of author teams for each journal. 
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5 Quality Characteristics 
In the preceding section, we described the development of geographical concentration by 
looking at the number of publications weighted by the journals' impact factor. Such an analysis 
neglects any differences between individual papers published within the same journal in a given 
year. If there are significant quality differences between different papers published in the same 
journal in a given year, the results from the preceding section could be biased. By focusing on 
the characteristics of individual experiments and papers, we try to uncover such differences in 
order to provide a more detailed picture. 
In subsection 5.1, we describe four proxies for the quality of laboratory experiments. We 
compare these proxies in subsection 5.2. This comparison reveals that there are differences 
regarding methodological standards between experiments conducted in North America and 
Europe17. In subsection 5.3, we describe three proxies for the quality of papers that report 
experimental results. All seven proxies are available prior to publication and might influence 
editors' decisions. This is not the case for the number of citations a paper receives after 
publication, which is arguably the most important ex post quality proxy as discussed in 
subsection 5.4. Finally, we compare the number of citations between experiments conducted in 
North America and Europe in subsection 5.5. 
5.1 Proxies for the Quality of Laboratory Experiments 
Although our proxies for the quality of an experiment (shorthand: P1-P4) are objectively 
measurable, they are only proxies. Thus, it is possible that they only weakly correlate with the 
true quality of an experiment, which is of course unknown. 
(P1 and P2) The first two quality proxies are the total number of participants and the number 
of participants per treatment. Both are related to the experiment's statistical power. For a more 
detailed discussion of power analysis in experimental economics see Czibor et al. (2019), 
Ioannidis et al. (2017), Bellemare et al. (2016, 2014), and Zhang and Ortmann (2013). 
                                                     
17 Since there are only a few papers in our data set where the majority of authors or all authors are female, we do 
not examine gender differences for the quality proxies. However, we control for the effect of gender in our 
regression analyses in section 6. 
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Experiments with higher power tend to generate fewer false positives and, hence, results are 
more likely to be replicated. This in turn could increase confidence in the experiment's results18. 
For a given number of treatments, a larger total number of participants yields more observations 
which increases statistical power if statistical testing is carried out at the participant-level. A 
similar proxy for quality is the number of participants per treatment. If an experiment contains 
a large number of treatments, and if the statistical analysis involves a pairwise comparison of 
treatments, the number of participants per treatment is a more suitable proxy for the 
experiment's power.  
Arguably, another possibility would be to consider the number of independent observations as 
a proxy for quality. However, the definition of what constitutes an independent observation is 
not clear-cut. Thus, we decided not to follow this approach (see chapter 3 in Svorenčík and 
Maas 2016). A further related aspect concerns the possibility to econometrically control for 
dependencies (see Moffatt 2015, 5-6). If dependencies are controlled for, the number of 
independent observations will underestimate the quality of the experiment19. 
(P3) The third proxy is the number of treatments. Ceteris paribus, a larger number of treatments 
increases quality because it allows to test for more alternative explanations. Testing for a higher 
number of alternative explanations, increases the scientific value of a paper. Linking the 
interpretation of results to a larger number of existing papers and ruling out more alternative 
hypothesis, yields more credibility to the authors claims. 
(P4) The fourth proxy is the strength of monetary incentives. According to the methodological 
literature on laboratory experiments, monetary incentives are related to the quality of an 
experiment. In fact, the use of monetary incentives is an established methodological standard 
in economics (see Hertwig and Ortmann 2001, 390) and all experiments in our data set use 
monetary incentives. This is possibly the case because experimental economists expect that 
they cannot publish their paper if they would use hypothetical rather than monetary incentives 
                                                     
18 Camerer at al. (2016) were able to successfully replicate the results of 11 out of 18 experiments. With the goal 
of making replication studies more attractive, Drazen et al. (2019) suggest a journal-based replication in which the 
journal contracts a replication after having accepted but before publishing a paper. 
19 For example, consider a T-times repeated public good game with stranger matching. Assume the experiment 
consists of two treatments, S sessions per treatment, and N participants per treatment. Due to the stranger matching 
protocol, all observations within the same sessions are dependent. The most conservative way would be to take a 
session's average contribution (pooled across participants and time) as one independent observation and compare 
session averages across treatments. Proceeding this way, would yield S independent observations per treatment. 
Exploiting the panel structure of the data and applying a random effects model, we could use each single decision 
as an observation resulting in a total of 2STN observations. 
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(Camerer and Hogarth 1999, 31)20. We operationalized the strength of monetary incentives by 
dividing a participant's average earnings (including the show-up fee) by the duration of the 
experiment (in minutes) and converting the result into real 2015 US-Dollars21. 
Regarding the strength of monetary incentives, Davis and Holt (1993, 24-25) argue that 
incentives should be high enough to cover opportunity costs. While this rule defines a lower 
limit for incentives, it does not postulate a clear relation between the strength of incentives and 
behavior. Camerer and Hogarth (1999, 31) show that the strength of monetary incentives affects 
behavior and increases data quality. With stronger incentives, subjects are less likely to show 
thoughtless behavior or make errors, leading to lower variance and less noise in the data. This, 
in turn, increases (statistical) power, allows for more precise statistical testing, and increases 
the likelihood of successful replication. According to this line of reasoning, experimental 
economists could increase the quality of their experiments by paying higher rewards22. 
Table 5 gives an overview of mean values for the quality proxies for the three journals. At first 
glance, we see that total number of participants, number of participants per treatment, and 
number of treatments are higher for the AER and the JEEA than for Exp Econ. As Table 5 
illustrates, the variable strength of monetary incentives could only be computed for 54% of 
AER papers, 72% of Exp Econ papers and 66% of JEEA papers. This is because, even in these 
prestigious journals, many papers do not report the number of participants, average earnings 
per participant, or the duration of the experiment. 
                                                     
20 For a more detailed discussion of monetary incentives see Bardsley et al. (chapter 6, 2010), Ortmann (2009), 
Read (2005), Guala (chapter 11, 2005), and Rydval and Ortmann (2004).  
21 Data for exchange rates is taken from fxtop.com. Data for CPI is taken from https://data.oecd.org. In some 
papers it was not stated in which year the experiment was conducted. In these cases we estimated the corresponding 
value by subtracting three years from the year of publication. 
22 A related aspect that is discussed by Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concerns participants' cognitive abilities. 
Together with monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation, cognitive abilities affect participants' mental effort. 
However, the effect from incentives on mental effort is likely to be non-monotonic, as recognized by Davis and 
Holt: "No amount of money can motivate participants to perform a calculation beyond their intellectual capacities, 
any more than generous bonuses would transform most of us into professional athletes" (Davis and Holt 1993, 
24). Because no data on participants' cognitive abilities are available, we could not include cognitive abilities in 
our set of quality proxies. We believe that this is unproblematic because there is no reason to expect any systematic 
differences in participants' cognitive abilities across experiments. 
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 AER 
𝑁 = 145 
Exp Econ 
𝑁 = 410 
JEEA 
𝑁 = 41 
P1: total # of participants 253.93 
(198.32) 
𝑁 = 137 
194.49 
(128.45) 
𝑁 = 407 
284.58 
(177.61) 
𝑁 = 40 
P2: # participants per treatment 68.76 
(87.59) 
𝑁 = 135 
55.33 
(40.97) 
𝑁 = 405 
61.82 
(41.81) 
𝑁 = 34 
P3: # treatments 4.48 
(3.00) 
𝑁 = 143 
3.90 
(2.29) 
𝑁 = 407 
4.74 
(2.43) 
𝑁 = 35 
P4: strength of monetary incentives 0.42 
(0.25) 
𝑁 = 79 
0.31 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 294 
0.35 
(0.16) 
𝑁 = 27 
Table 5: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of observations for experiments' proxies. 
5.2 Are there Differences in Methodological Standards? 
In this subsection, we examine whether there are clearly defined methodological standards with 
regard to the ex ante proxies for quality as described above. If this were the case, one would 
expect to find no differences regarding these proxies between experiments conducted in 
different regions. 
In the following, we look only at laboratory experiments conducted in North America or 
Europe. More than 83% of the laboratory experiments in the papers within our dataset were 
conducted in these two regions. 
P1: total # 
participants  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 220.33 
(165.06) 
𝑁 = 76 
361.79 
(254.22) 
𝑁 = 39 
268.30 
(209.74) 
𝑁 = 115 
0.0004 
Exp Econ 168.56 
(95.55) 
𝑁 = 166 
204.93 
(126.44) 
𝑁 = 169 
186.91 
(113.50) 
𝑁 = 335 
0.0114 
JEEA 243.57 
(117.08) 
𝑁 = 14 
295.83 
(212.04) 
𝑁 = 23 
276.05 
(181.90) 
𝑁 = 37 
0.9568 
all three  188.03 
(123.88) 
𝑁 = 256 
240.47 
(174.32) 
𝑁 = 231 
212.90 
(152.05) 
𝑁 = 487 
0.0005 
Table 6: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of observations for total number of 
participants by region and journal. The last column shows the exact p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
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P2:  # 
participants 
per 
treatment  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 55.00 
(44.95) 
𝑁 = 75 
109.12 
(143.31) 
𝑁 = 39 
73.51 
(94.31) 
𝑁 = 114 
0.0001 
Exp Econ 49.20 
(33.94) 
𝑁 = 165 
59.97 
(40.76) 
𝑁 = 168 
54.63 
(37.87) 
𝑁 = 333 
0.0033 
JEEA 37.90 
(18.25) 
𝑁 = 11 
73.53 
(47.16) 
𝑁 = 21 
61.29 
(42.88) 
𝑁 = 32 
0.0122 
all three  50.43 
(37.17) 
𝑁 = 251 
69.63 
(72.08) 
𝑁 = 228 
59.57 
(57.29) 
𝑁 = 479 
<0.0001 
Table 7: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of observations for participants per 
treatment by region and journal. The last column shows the exact p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
P3: # 
treatments  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 4.44 
(2.98) 
3 
𝑁 = 81 
4.78 
(3.39) 
4 & 6 
𝑁 = 40 
4.55 
(3.11) 
3 
𝑁 = 121 
0.7009 
Exp Econ 3.94 
(2.30) 
4 
𝑁 = 167 
3.79 
(2.34) 
4 
𝑁 = 168 
3.87 
(2.32) 
4 
𝑁 = 335 
0.3810 
JEEA 5.00 
(3.02) 
2 
𝑁 = 12 
4.48 
(2.09) 
3 
𝑁 = 21 
4.67 
(2.43) 
3 
𝑁 = 33 
0.8438 
all three 4.15 
(2.57) 
4 
𝑁 = 260 
4.03 
(2.55) 
4 
𝑁 = 229 
4.09 
(2.56) 
4 
𝑁 = 489 
0.4945 
Table 8: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), modes, and number of observations for number of 
treatments by region and journal. The last column shows the exact p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
 
P4: strength 
of monetary 
incentives  
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER 0.39 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 41 
0.48 
(0.34) 
𝑁 = 30 
0.43 
(0.26) 
𝑁 = 71 
0.1264 
Exp Econ 0.32 
(0.14) 
𝑁 = 118 
0.35 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 131 
0.34 
(0.15) 
𝑁 = 249 
0.0425 
JEEA 0.38 
(0.16) 
𝑁 = 7 
0.33 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 18 
0.35 
(0.17) 
𝑁 = 25 
0.7451 
all three 0.34 
(0.15) 
𝑁 = 166 
0.37 
(0.21) 
𝑁 = 179 
0.36 
(0.18) 
𝑁 = 345 
0.0491 
Table 9: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of observations for strength of monetary 
incentives by region and journal. The last column shows the exact p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney test. 
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Table 6 to Table 9 show the mean values of the ex ante proxies for quality by journal and region. 
With respect to the total number of participants (P1) or the number of participants per treatment 
(P2), there seems to be no universal methodological standard. Rather, there appear to be 
systematic differences between experiments conducted in both regions. 
Except for the JEEA, experiments conducted in Europe involve a significantly larger total 
number of participants. For all journals, European experiments have a significantly larger 
number of participants per treatment. These discrepancies possibly emerge from differences 
with regard to (the definition of) what constitutes an independent observation, as emphasized 
by Frans van Winden: 
"I can remember at the Amsterdam meetings that there were some heated discussions, 
and they were related to three topics. First of all, what is an independent observation? 
What I remember is that people from the United States were more liberal in the sense 
that they applied parametric statistics whereas the Germans, especially of course 
Reinhard Selten and the group he influenced, were stricter on that."  
(Frans van Winden, cited in Svorenčík and Maas 2016, 188-198). 
Another possible explanation for the differences in the total number of participants and the 
number of participants per treatment (P1 and P2) is that there are disparities in the types of 
experiments conducted in the two regions (e.g., individual decision making, public good games, 
market experiments...) that require different numbers of participants. If there are systematic 
differences in the distribution of types, our measures P1 and P2 will be biased. A cursory look 
into our data reveals that for almost all experiment types, the number of participants is higher 
for experiments conducted in Europe, indicating that it is unlikely that our results are driven by 
differences in types. However, while some experiments can be easily classified as certain types, 
there are many experiments that are hard to classify. 
With regard to the number of treatments, there are no significant differences between North-
American and European experiments (see Table 8). Across journals and continents, the mode 
of treatments per experiment is four. 
The bottom row of Table 9 indicates that the strength of monetary incentives is significantly 
higher for experiments conducted in Europe. However, the difference is small and, at the journal 
level, we only observe a small significant difference for Exp Econ. We therefore conclude that 
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this observation is compatible with the existence of a common standard for how to incentivize 
participants in Europe and North America. 
Our results for the total number of participants and the strength of monetary incentives could 
suggest that experimental economists from Europe have to pay a higher price for publishing 
their papers, compared to experimental economists from North America. Another explanation 
might be that economists in Europe have easier access to research funding compared to their 
colleagues in the US23. 
The differences in the total number of participants (P1) could be driven by a cohort effect. 
Section 4.2 showed that the US’s research output was very high in the first two periods before 
it then decreased. If P1 increases over time, and if this increase has the same magnitude for 
experiments conducted in North America and Europe, the differences in P1 in Table 6 would 
only reflect the fact that the share of experiments conducted in the US decreased. To rule out 
such cohort effects, we look at P1 for four periods. Table 19 (appendix B) shows that there are 
almost no significant differences in P1 for the first and second period. However, from the 
periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018, P1 for European experiments for both journals is always 
higher and in most cases, the difference is statistically significant. Moreover, the difference 
between North America and Europe increases over time. This suggests that the differences in 
P1 for the pooled data (1999-2018) are not driven by the decreasing share of US output. Rather, 
they are driven by differences in P1 in the two most recent periods. 
5.3 Ex Ante Proxies for a Paper's Quality 
Ex ante proxies represent information that is available before the paper is accepted for 
publication. Thus, such proxies can be used by referees and editors when deciding about 
whether to accept or reject a submitted paper. Our four proxies, P1 to P4, represent such ex ante 
proxies. However, aspects such as novelty, originality, and practical relevance are also available 
ex ante and are important for a paper's quality. Attempting to account for such additional ex 
ante proxies, we include four additional variables: the number of pages, the number of 
                                                     
23 We thank Gary Charness for drawing our attention to this aspect. Unfortunately, there are no sources for the 
amount of research funding for experimental economists in different regions. However, we consider it unlikely 
that there is a causal relationship between the availability of research funding and the average total number of 
participants. Even if research funds were easier available in Europe, they could be used, for example, to conduct 
more (single) projects. 
24 
 
references, authors’ reputation, and the number of authors. When testing for editorial favoritism 
(in section 6), we will control for these variables. 
(P5) In line with the results of Card and DellaVigna (2014, 2013), Medoff (2003), and Laband 
and Piette (1994a), we expect a positive correlation between the number of pages and quality. 
We assume that editors are willing to allocate more journal space to high quality papers. Since 
the journals have different formats and therefore different numbers of words per page, 
whenever necessary, we converted the number of pages into Exp Econ-equivalent pages. 
(P6) We expect a positive correlation between the number of references and quality. We assume 
that authors who cite a larger number of references have studied a larger amount of related 
literature before conducting their own research. As we explain in subsection 5.4 below, we use 
citations received in the 5 and 10 years after the publication of a paper as a proxy for the ex post 
quality. It seems plausible that a paper with a higher number of references also receives more 
attention from the scientific community than a paper with only a smaller number of references.  
(P7) As shown in Card et al. (2020), Hengel and Moon (2020), Brogaard et al. (2014), Medoff 
(2003), and Laband and Piette (1994a), an author's reputation is likely to have a positive effect 
on the paper's quality. We proxy authors’ reputation by their stock of citations. In case of a 
single author, we take the total number of citations received by the author during the 5 years 
prior to the publication of the paper. In case of more than one author, we take the average of all 
authors' citations during the 5 years prior to the publication of the paper24. Editors could view 
a scholar's stock of prior citations as a signal of the expected scientific contribution of her paper 
(see Medoff 2003, 428-429)25. It is also conceivable that, regardless of the paper's quality, 
papers authored by well-known economists tend to attract more citations (Merton's Matthew 
effect, see Merton 1968). 
(P8) In line with the related literature (Card et al. 2020, Hengel and Moon 2020, Brogaard et 
al. 2014), we control for the number of authors for each paper. While Hengel and Moon (2020) 
find a positive effect for the number of authors on the number of citations, Brogaard et al. 
                                                     
24 The average number of authors increased significantly from the first period (1999-2003, mean: 2.31) to each of 
the three subsequent periods (2004-2008, mean: 2.54, 𝑝 = 0.032; 2009-2013, mean: 2.65, 𝑝 < 0.01; 2014-2018, 
mean: 2.53, 𝑝 = 0.025; p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests). However, the increase is small and there 
are no significant differences in the average number of authors in the last three periods. We therefore assume that 
our measure of reputation is not distorted by changes in the average number of authors. 
25 This requires that editors can identify authors (identities) despite the referee process being double blind. In a 
field experiment, Blank (1991) found that in AER's double blind referee process, about 50% of referees could 
correctly identify the authors. Given that many authors post preliminary versions of their papers online, we assume 
that, in many cases, editors can also identify the authors. 
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(2014) find negative or null effects, depending on the statistical models26. Therefore, we do not 
expect to find a clear effect for this proxy. 
5.4 Citations as Proxy for Ex Post Quality 
Ex post proxies measure the quality of a paper after its publication. We focus on only one proxy, 
namely citations27. This does not imply that citations reflect a paper's true quality. Rather, we 
decided to use the number of citations because data on citations is widely available and is 
heavily used (at least as a yardstick) to allocate positions and resources (Card et al. 2020, Card 
and DellaVigna 2020, Hamermesh 2018, Moed 2006, Laband and Piette 1994b). Moreover, 
assuming that editors seek to maximize their journals' impact factor, they have an incentive to 
accept papers that they expect to receive a high number of citations. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distributions of citations received in the 5 and 10 years 
following the publication by journal. Due to the small number of observations for the JEEA, 
we plot the distributions only for the AER and Exp Econ (but present some descriptive statistics 
in Table 10). The distributions are heavily skewed to the right. As one would expect, laboratory 
experiments published in the AER receive significantly more citations than laboratory 
experiments published in Exp Econ.  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in the AER, 5 and 10 years after 
publication. 
                                                     
26 Brogaard et al. (2014) note that this result is not very meaningful, as their measure of the authors' reputation is 
strongly correlated with the number of authors. 
27 Other ex post proxies are being reprinted in anthologies or the amount of media-coverage. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of citations for laboratory experiments published in Exp Econ, 5 and 10 years after 
publication. 
5.5 Are there Differences in Citations? 
Subsection 5.2 showed that North American and European experiments differ with respect to 
the total number of participants (P1) and the number of participants per treatment (P2). This 
raises the question whether this difference is associated with a difference in ex post quality, i.e., 
the number of citations. If there is a positive correlation between the total number of 
participants or the number of participants per treatment and the experiment's quality, one 
would expect that European experiments receive a higher number of citations on average.  
Table 10 and Table 11 show that laboratory experiments conducted in Europe receive more 
citations compared to laboratory experiments conducted in North America. For the 5-year 
period after publication, this holds for all three journals, while for the 10-year period after 
publication this only applies to papers published in the AER and Exp Econ. For the JEEA, there 
are too few observations because the JEEA only launched in 2003. 
Most differences for mean values are not only statistically significant but also, more 
importantly, large in magnitude. For example, looking at citations in the 10 years after 
publication for experiments published in the AER, we see that European experiments received, 
on average, 124 citations while North American experiments only received an average of 61 
citations. Since citations are heavily skewed to the right we also perform a test for differences 
in medians in Table 10 and Table 11. There are only significant differences in medians for 
citations received in the 5 years after publication for laboratory experiments published in the 
AER and Exp Econ. 
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citations five years 
after publication 
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
23.32 
17.00 
58.00 
(22.22) 
73 
40.29 
32.00 
97.00 
(35.69) 
35 
28.81 
20.00 
65.00 
(28.30) 
108 
0.0021 
0.029 
Exp 
Econ 
mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
6.20 
4.00 
15.50 
(7.87) 
80 
10.62 
6.00 
23.00 
(13.03) 
87 
8.50 
4.00 
17.00 
(11.06) 
167 
0.0037 
0.007 
 
JEEA mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
20.89 
12.00 
83.00 
(24.61) 
9 
27.20 
10.00 
97.00 
(47.58) 
10 
24.21 
12.00 
83.00 
(37.57) 
19 
0.6748 
0.788 
all 
three 
mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
14.73 
7.00 
36.00 
(18.79) 
162 
19.74 
11.00 
46.00 
(27.75) 
132 
16.98 
9.00 
42.00 
(23.33) 
294 
0.1091 
0.140 
Table 10: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of 
observations for citations in the 5 years after publication (‘c5’) by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of 
the last column contains the p-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square 
test), comparing the distribution of c5 between North America and Europe.  
citations ten years 
after publication 
North America Europe both regions p-value 
AER mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
61.34 
46.50 
128.00 
(74.56) 
44 
123.62 
101.00 
275.00 
(106.33) 
13 
75.74 
40.00 
171.00 
(85.94) 
57 
0.0178 
0.482 
Exp 
Econ 
mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
13.55 
9.00 
27.00 
(15.07) 
42 
33.57 
14.00 
88.00 
(45.69) 
23 
20.63 
11.00 
43.00 
(30.92) 
65 
0.0511 
0.541 
 
JEEA mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
8.00 
8.00 
8.00 
- 
1 
31.50 
31.50 
46.00 
(20.51) 
2 
23.67 
17.00 
46.00 
(19.86) 
3 
not enough 
observ. 
both mean 
median 
90%-p. 
sd 
N 
37.66 
19.00 
86.00 
(58.90) 
87 
64.26 
35.00 
176.00 
(82.47) 
38 
45.74 
21.00 
118.00 
(67.72) 
125 
0.0762 
0.318 
Table 11: Mean values, medians, 90% percentiles, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of 
observations for citations in the 10 years after publication (‘c10’) by region and journal. The upper (lower) row of 
the last column contains the p-values of a two-sample Mann-Whitney test (continuity corrected Pearson Chi-square 
test), comparing the distribution of c10 between North America and Europe. 
6 Citations, Quality Proxies, and Editorial Favoritism 
In this section, we examine whether the differences in citations are driven by differences in the 
quality proxies P1 to P8 or if they are indicative of editorial favoritism. 
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6.1 Editorial Favoritism 
With regard to the quality proxies discussed in subsection 5.1, there is no reason to assume that 
clearly defined standards exist. In absence of clearly defined standards, editors have a lot of 
leeway. Moreover, the proxies do not capture a paper's originality and relevance. Originality 
and relevance are highly subjective and might be unknown to editors when deciding about 
publication. This makes it possible that non-scientific criteria can have an influence on editors' 
decisions, thus facilitating discrimination. It is even possible that the US dominance results 
from the behavior of editors, whose decisions are influenced by non-scientific criteria28. 
In order to assess whether editorial favoritism is present in experimental economics, we use an 
analysis similar to Medoff (2003) and Laband and Piette (1994a). Unlike Medoff (2003) and 
Laband and Piette (1994a), we do not focus on a single year of publication, but a period of 
several years. In the literature (Colussi 2018, Brogaard et al. 2014, Medoff 2003, Laband and 
Piette 1994a), there are multiple methods for measuring social ties. For our analysis we do not 
consider social ties between authors and editorial board members at the institutional level. 
Instead, we specify our measure of social ties as the share of authors with a US affiliation29. 
More specifically, we test the hypothesis that for AER papers, the share of US-affiliated authors 
is negatively correlated with the number of citations. 
If confirmed, this would indicate that there is editorial favoritism in the AER. We hypothesize 
editorial favoritism for the AER, because almost all members of the AER's editorial board are 
affiliated with a North American (mostly US) institution30. We do not hypothesize editorial 
favoritism for Exp Econ and the JEEA, because only half of their editorial boards consists of 
North American-affiliated economists31. 
                                                     
28 Other reasons for the US dominance are mentioned in Frey and Pommerehne (1998). Firstly, the social and 
political conditions for research are very good in the US, leading to immigration of skilled researchers into the US. 
Secondly, the incentives for good research (in terms of publications in top journals) are very strong in the US. And 
thirdly, language: papers published in a language other than English will rarely receive the same amount of 
attention as papers published in English because English is the lingua franca of economics. For economists whose 
native language is not English, publishing in English is associated with higher costs because one has to adopt the 
language, style, and format common to the US. We believe that these reasons have weakend during the last years. 
29 Laband and Piette (1994a: 201) note that a broad range of social ties between editors and authors are not included 
in their analysis. Due to this fact and due to our long observation period, we are confident that our measure of 
social ties is suitable to show possible effects of editorial favoritism. 
30 AER's editorial board consists of 77 individuals, serving as editor, coeditor, or board member. 72 individuals 
(93.50%) are affiliated with a North American-institution. Out of the five remaining individuals, three received 
their PhDs from US universities (https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editors, accessed May 22, 2019). 
31 Exp Econ’s editorial board consists of 59 individuals, serving as editor, advisory editor, or member of the 
editorial board. 28 individuals (47.46%) are affiliated with North American-institutions. The rest of the editorial 
board includes 23 individuals (38.98%) with a European affiliation, 6 individuals with an affiliation in Australia 
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In order to test our hypothesis, we apply the following regression models. 
Models 1 and 4: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 + 𝛾8𝑃8𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖       (1) 
Models 2 and 5: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑃1𝑖+𝛾4𝑃4𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 +
                      𝛾8𝑃8𝑖+𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖              (2) 
Models 3 and 6: 
𝑐𝑖(5, 10) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑃2𝑖 + 𝛾3  𝑃3𝑖+𝛾4𝑃4𝑖 + 𝛾5𝑃5𝑖 + 𝛾6𝑃6𝑖 + 𝛾7𝑃7𝑖 +
                      𝛾8𝑃8𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑃&𝑃𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖            (3) 
The dependent variables 𝑐𝑖(5) and 𝑐𝑖(10) represent the total number of citations paper i 
received during the 5 or 10 years after publication. Because the number of citations is left-
censored by 0, we used Tobit regressions. For our robustness checks (appendix B) we followed 
the literature (Hengel and Moon 2020, Card et al. 2020) and used the inverse hyperbolic sine 
(asinh) of citations and the log of “1 + citations” as dependent variables. Note that data on 𝑐𝑖(5) 
(𝑐𝑖(10)) is available only for papers published in 2013 (2008) or earlier. 
Our measure of social ties, 𝑆𝑇𝑖, is the relative share of US-affiliated authors for paper 𝑖
32. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 estimates the difference in quality (measured by the number of citations) between 
AER papers authored by scholars with and without a US-affiliation. In the presence of editorial 
favoritism, we expect 𝛽1 < 0. 
                                                     
or New Zealand, and one individual each with an affiliation in Asia or South America 
(https://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/10683?detailsPage=editorialBoard, accessed 
May 22, 2019). The JEEA’s editorial board consists of 72 individuals, serving as editor, associate editor, or 
member of the advisory board. 37 individuals are affiliated with a European institution, 34 individuals are affiliated 
with a North-American institution, and one individual is affiliated with an institution in Asia 
(https://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?site=JEEA&page=175&trsz=45, accessed October 1, 2019). 
32 This definition differs from e.g., Laband and Piette (1994a) and Medoff (2003) who focus on authors who 
received their PhDs from the same university the editor was affiliated with at the time of the publication. We focus 
on US versus non-US-affiliations because the AER has several rules that prevent editorial favoritism on the level 
of institutions. For example, "[co-]editors are recused from papers involving current colleagues at the same 
institution (regardless of department), as well as graduate students at the same institution" (for all rules see: 
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer/about-aer/editorial-policy). We excluded papers (𝑁 = 7) reporting 
laboratory experiments conducted in the US by authors that do not have an affiliation in the US, because for these 
papers it is unclear whether a social tie exists. 
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The variable 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑖 measures the relative share of female authors for paper 𝑖. If higher quality 
requirements for female authors lead to a substantially higher quality of the respective papers, 
we expect 𝛽2 > 0. 
The paper's quality proxies, number of pages (P5), number of references (P6), authors’ 
reputation (P7), and number of authors (P8) are included in each model specification. Models 
1 and 4 only include these proxies. In models 2 and 5, the total number of participants (P1) and 
the strength of incentives (P4) are added. In models 3 and 6, we further include the number of 
participants per treatment (P2), the number of treatments (P3), and the strength of incentives 
(P4). Based on sections 5.1 and 5.3, except for the number of authors (P8), we expect all 
proxies' coefficients to be positive. For the AER regressions, P&Pi is an indicator variable for 
papers published in AER's Papers and Proceedings, which we include in models 1 to 6. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 24.61** 40.23** 43.68** 162.39*** 283.48*** 350.73*** 
 (10.77) (19.86) (21.57) (46.70) (84.80) (85.21) 
       
ST -11.82** -24.90*** -26.02*** -53.62** -118.71*** -152.56*** 
 (5.23) (8.78) (8.99) (25.67) (38.98) (36.19) 
       
Fem 13.82* 20.92 21.21 29.90 14.30 -34.58 
 (8.09) (13.03) (13.31) (36.89) (81.78) (82.83) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.02   -0.06  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.02)   (0.08)  
       
P2   -0.04   -0.20** 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.03)   (0.09) 
       
P3   -1.10   -2.24 
(treatments)   (1.39)   (7.86) 
       
P4  -3.00 -2.83  -6.76 -18.62 
(incentives)  (13.19) (13.54)  (42.68) (41.18) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.30 -0.08 0.01 -2.04 -1.79 -2.46 
(pages) (0.27) (0.44) (0.45) (1.29) (2.48) (2.96) 
       
P6 0.63*** 0.53** 0.51** 0.58 -1.05 -1.94 
(references) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24) (0.80) (1.53) (1.62) 
       
P7 0.02*** 0.02* 0.02 0.06 0.31 0.42 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.29) (0.30) 
       
P8 -3.06 -5.49 -5.83 -10.13 -25.24 -22.86 
(authors) (2.51) (3.79) (3.94) (10.61) (19.52) (15.51) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -11.10 -0.16 5.25 -70.00** -36.80 -68.85 
 (7.92) (16.42) (18.66) (28.93) (57.68) (61.55) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.06 
Table 12: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem) and papers' 
and experiments'  quality proxies. AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
Table 12 shows the regression results for papers published in the AER. Taking the number of 
citations in the 5 years after publication as a proxy for quality, we find a significant negative 
effect of social ties for models 1 to 3 (𝛽1 < 0). This suggests that papers from authors with 
stronger social ties (i.e., a larger share of US-affiliated authors) have a lower quality compared 
to papers from authors with affiliations outside the US. More precisely, 𝛽1 measures the 
difference in citations between a paper with solely US-affiliated authors and a paper without 
any US-affiliated authors. Based on models 1 to 3, papers with solely US-affiliated authors 
receive between 12 and 26 citations less in the 5 years after publication. The results are even 
stronger when we take the number of citations in the 10 years after publication as a proxy for 
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quality (models 4 to 6). On average, papers with solely US-affiliated authors receive between 
54 and 153 citations less compared to papers without any US-affiliated authors. For alternative 
specifications of our dependent variables (appendix B, Table 20 and Table 21) we find 
qualitatively similar results33. 
This difference can be interpreted as indirect evidence for discrimination, indicating that a paper 
from a US-based author is accepted for publication despite a higher-quality paper from an 
author with an affiliation outside the US being available. Of course, this only holds true if high-
quality papers from authors without social ties to the editorial board were submitted and 
rejected. However, given the AER's rejection rate, we think that this is highly plausible34. 
This, however, does not imply that editors consciously discriminate against authors from 
outside the US. Rather, it is possible that editors systematically fail to predict the number of 
citations a paper will receive in the years following its publication (i.e., editors wrongly predict 
that papers authored by US-based economists receive more citations than they actually do). 
Nonetheless, if citations can be taken as a proxy for quality, this will slow down scientific 
progress, and editors will fail to maximize their journal's impact factor.  
6.2 How do the Quality Proxies of AER Papers Affect Citations? 
Regarding the proxies for experimental quality (P1 to P4), only the number of participants per 
treatment (P2) affects citations. For each model, the total number of participants (P1), the 
number of treatments (P3), and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) have no effect on the 
number of citations in the 5 or 10 years after publication. This does not imply that editors do 
not care about the experiments' quality proxies. Rather, it could be that there are minimum 
standards that have to be fulfilled in order to get a paper published, but going beyond those 
standards does not increase experimental quality any further. In other words, the perceived 
                                                     
33 As further robustness checks, we test how our results from subsections 6.1 to 6.3 change if we use another proxy 
for social ties (see appendix B, Table 22 to Table 27). Instead of 𝑆𝑇𝑖  we introduce an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if all experiments included in a paper were carried out exclusively in North America (US and Canada). 
For 4 to 5 models in Table 22 to Table 24 (AER) and for 4 to 6 models in Table 25 to Table 27 (Exp Econ) we see 
that experiments conducted in North America receive significantly fewer citations in the 5 and 10 years after 
publication. The results for the quality characteristics (P1 to P8) are qualitatively similar to the results in section 
6. 
34 In 2018, for example, only 5.85% of all submissions were accepted at the AER (Duflo 2019). Medoff (2003, 
427) discusses several reasons why it is problematic to infer a possible editorial favoritism from the acceptance 
rates of a journal. 
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quality of an experiment that has a sufficient number of treatments and sufficiently strong 
incentives might not increase by adding additional treatments or by paying higher incentives. 
In model 6 in Table 12 (see also appendix B, Table 20 and Table 21), the number of participants 
per treatment (P2) is statistically significant but negative – contrary to what we expected. Why 
should a paper's quality decrease when the number of participants per treatment increases? 
Finding a smaller effect requires an experiment with a larger number of participants per 
treatment. Thus, if there is an inverse relation between quality and effect size, possibly because 
smaller effects are perceived as less interesting, this could explain the negative effect. 
Next, we turn to the paper's quality proxies (P5 to P8). The number of pages (P5) and the 
number of authors (P8) have no effect on citations. Taking the number of citations in the 5 
years after publication as a proxy for quality (models 1 to 3), the number of references (P6) has 
a significant effect. Approximately 1.5 to 2 additional references yield one additional citation. 
The authors’ reputation (P7) has a small effect for models 1 and 2. For 50 citations a single 
author (or an average co-author) has accumulated in the 5 years prior publication, the expected 
number of citations increases by 135. However, if we take citations in the 10 years after 
publication as dependent variable, the number of references and the authors’ reputation have 
no effect. 
It seems that if the paper's quality proxies have any effects on citations, these effects are positive 
for citations during the 5 years after publication, but disappear for citations during the 10 years 
after publication. Perhaps the number of references (P6) and the authors’ reputation (P7) attract 
some attention to the paper, leading to more citations, but this effect vanishes as the paper grows 
older. 
6.3 How do the Quality Proxies of Exp Econ and JEEA Papers Affect Citations? 
In Table 13 and Table 14, we report the main results for papers published in Exp Econ and the 
JEEA respectively.  
 
                                                     
35 Note that our proxy for reputation (the number of citations an author has received in the 5 years before the 
paper's publication) is right-skewed (see appendix B, Figure 4 and Figure 5). For AER-papers from North America 
(Europe), the median is 74 (88) and the mean is 147 (247). This reflects Merton's Matthew effect. Those who 
already have large number of citations receive more citations. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 9.36*** 6.50* 6.19 34.31** 5.28 -5.50 
 (3.05) (3.87) (4.17) (13.96) (18.46) (18.73) 
       
ST -2.45 -1.82 -1.78 -10.64 -3.75 -10.04 
 (1.59) (1.75) (1.74) (7.33) (9.77) (9.40) 
       
Fem -1.38 -0.79 -1.79 -2.63 9.03 -1.18 
 (2.64) (2.87) (2.93) (12.05) (15.51) (14.83) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.01   0.08*  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.01)   (0.05)  
       
P2   0.00   0.07 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.02)   (0.15) 
       
P3   0.62   7.28*** 
(treatments)   (0.38)   (2.26) 
       
P4  3.91 2.63  14.34 20.19 
(incentives)  (4.19) (4.23)  (22.63) (21.26) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.45*** -1.19* -1.38* -1.07 
(pages) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.61) (0.72) (0.68) 
       
P6 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.59** 0.53 0.49 
(references) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.29) (0.36) (0.34) 
       
P7 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.05 0.03 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
P8 -0.55 -0.01 -0.25 -1.57 3.68 1.74 
(authors) (0.79) (0.85) (0.84) (3.40) (4.40) (4.12) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 
Table 13: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), and 
experiments' and papers’ quality proxies. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
As can be seen from Table 13, for Exp Econ papers the relative share of US-based authors (𝑆𝑇) 
has no significant effect on citations. The number of treatments (P3) has a positive effect on 
citations in the 10 years after publication. For each additional treatment, the expected number 
of citations increases by 7.28. The total number of participants (P1) has no effect on citations 
in the 5 years, and a small positive effect on citations in the 10 years after publication. The 
number of participants per treatment (P2) and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) are not 
significant.  
The number of references (P6) has a small but positive effect on citations in models 1 to 4. The 
authors’ reputation (P7) has a small positive effect, but only on citations in the 5 years after 
publication. Finally, papers with a higher number of pages (P5) tend to receive fewer citations. 
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The non-significant effects of P1 to P4 possibly stem from the fact that the distribution of 
citations in the 5 years after publication is much narrower for Exp Econ, compared to the AER 
and the JEEA (see Table 10). For alternative specifications of the dependent variables 
(appendix B, Table 28 and Table 29) we find qualitatively similar results. Only in model 1, the 
relative share of US-based authors (ST) takes a significantly negative value. In model 6, the 
effect on the number of treatments (P3) is no longer significant.  
Regarding the author’s reputation (P7) for Exp Econ, our results are in line with the findings 
of previous literature (Medoff 2003, Laband and Piette 1994a)36. However, our results differ 
regarding the number of pages (P5) since Card and DellaVigna (2014, 2013), Medoff (2003), 
and Laband and Piette (1994a) find that longer papers are associated with a higher number of 
citations. 
  
                                                     
36 Card et al. (2020) and Hengel and Moon (2020) use alternative measures for authors' reputation (previous top 
publications) and are therefore only partially comparable with our results. Nevertheless, they also find that the 
reputation of authors has a positive effect on the number of citations. 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 c5 c5 c5 
Constant 21.43 -10.76 -33.76 
 (34.78) (28.05) (45.81) 
    
ST -18.85 7.26 10.40 
 (20.22) (13.77) (22.96) 
    
Fem 57.73** 37.30** 57.82** 
 (23.38) (14.82) (21.44) 
    
Experiment Quality    
P1  0.17***  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.03)  
    
P2   0.54** 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.20) 
    
P3   5.62 
(treatments)   (3.52) 
    
P4  -75.22 -95.55 
(incentives)  (43.29) (63.91) 
    
Paper Quality    
P5 -0.28 -1.58** -1.25 
(pages) (0.79) (0.53) (0.93) 
    
P6 0.62 0.57 0.79 
(references) (0.53) (0.36) (0.54) 
    
P7 0.01 0.01 0.02 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
P8 -6.17 7.77 6.31 
(authors) (6.62) (4.63) (7.14) 
N 21 15 15 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.19 0.12 
Table 14: Tobit regressions of c(5) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), and experiments' and 
papers’ quality proxies. JEEA papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 14 shows that, for papers published in the JEEA, the relative share of US-affiliated 
authors (𝑆𝑇) also has no significant effect on citations in the 5 years after publication. Note that 
Table 14 only reports the results for models 1 to 3 because there are only four laboratory 
experiments for which we have data on the citations in the 10 years after publication. The total 
number of participants (P1) and the number of participants per treatment (P2) each have a 
positive effect. The number of treatments (P3) and the strength of monetary incentives (P4) are 
not significant.  
For the JEEA, the results for a papers’ quality (P5 to P7) show almost no effects. Only in model 
2, papers with a higher number of pages (P5) tend to receive fewer citations. 
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When we change the specification of the dependent variable (see appendix B, Table 30 and 
Table 31), for the JEEA, the positive effects for the total number of participants (P1) and 
number of participants per treatment (P2) persist. For both alternative specifications, the 
number of references (P6) has a positive effect in model 1. 
6.4 How does the Authors’ Gender Affect Citations? 
For the AER (Table 12 and appendix B, Table 21 to Table 24), we observe that the relative 
share of female authors (Fem) has a significant positive effect on the number of citations a 
paper receives in the 5 years following publication for some specifications. For the 
specifications with our alternative proxy for social ties (experiment conducted in North 
America), the effect of Fem is strongest in models 2 and 3, where we control for the impact of 
the experimental quality proxies.  For the JEEA (Table 14 and appendix B, Table 30 and Table 
31), the relative share of female authors (Fem) has a strong significant positive effect on the 
number of citations in all specifications. For Exp Econ, no significant effect of the relative share 
of female authors (Fem) can be observed in any specification. 
With regard to possible gender effects, our results for the AER and the JEEA are partly in line 
with the results of Card et al. (2020) and Hengel and Moon (2020). However, their results rely 
on many more observations than our results which is why we refrain from a deeper 
interpretation of our results in this aspect. Surprisingly, we observe no gender effects for Exp 
Econ. This could indicate that gender effects are mainly present in highly ranked journals. 
6.5 Network Effects as an Alternative Explanation 
Differences in citation practices and network effects could be an alternative explanation for the 
significantly lower number of citations received by US-affiliated authors in the AER. The 
majority of experimental economists (about 58 %) are affiliated with Europe37. If they are more 
familiar with each other's work, this could lead to a higher number of citations from European 
authors to other European authors. Put bluntly, most experimental economists are in Europe, 
and if they cite each other, this increases the number of citations received by European 
economist but not by non-European economists. This is in line with Frey and Pommerehne 
                                                     
37 To get an idea of the total number of experimental economists in different regions, we checked the affiliations 
of all authors of the current RePEc list of authors in experimental economics (𝑁 = 1831). With 57.84%, more 
than half of all experimental economists on this list have a European affiliation, followed by economists with an 
affiliation in North America (30.20%), Asia (5.90%), Australia or New Zealand (3.82%), South America (1.86%), 
and Africa (0.38%). See, https://ideas.repec.org/i/eexp.html (accessed October 5, 2019). 
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(1988, 107) who argue that economists may tend to cite economists from the same country 
more often for personal or professional reasons, or simply because they know them best. If this 
is true, citations are a biased measure of quality. Moreover, the results from Table 12 might not 
be driven by the composition of AER’s editorial board, but simply by network effects resulting 
from differences in citation practices and differences in the population of experimental 
economists with a US- or European-affiliation.  
To test this alternative explanation, we assess where citations originate from. We selected the 
most cited papers from our dataset38 that were authored solely by economists with a US- (16 
papers) or European-affiliation (11 papers), and analyzed where their received citations came 
from. The results show that the US-affiliated authors received, on average, 38.72% of their 
citations from North America, 50.42% of their citations from Europe, and 10.86% of their 
citations from the rest of the world. The respective numbers for the European-affiliated authors 
are 63.17% from Europe, 27.53% from North America and 9.31% from the rest of the world. 
The numbers for the European-affiliated authors thus almost match the geographical 
distribution of experimental economists on the RePEc list. Compared to the European-affiliated 
authors, the US-affiliated authors received a considerably lower share of their citations from 
Europe. This suggests that differences in citation practices and network effects that increase the 
citations of European-affiliated authors could at least partly drive our results. However, if 
differences in citation practices and network effects were solely responsible for our findings 
regarding ex post quality, we would expect a negative effect of social ties across all journals. 
As shown in Table 13 and Table 14, this is not or, in the case of alternative model specifications, 
only partially the case. Moreover, the assumption that social ties between experimental 
economists in Europe are as strong as those between experimental economists in the US does 
not seem plausible. While the majority of US-affiliated authors are likely to be native English 
speakers and all work within one country, our dataset for the European region includes authors 
with affiliations in 20 different countries. Only a few of the European-affiliated authors share 
the same mother tongue, and it is also likely that the European-affiliated authors will, most 
frequently, attend conferences and seminars at national level. For our dataset, we therefore 
believe that social ties between US-affiliated authors are more pronounced than between 
European-affiliated authors. 
                                                     
38 The criteria were that these papers received at least 40 (100) citations in the 5 (10) years after publication. 
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6.6 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to our approach. First, we only collected data on laboratory 
experiments published in three journals. It is not clear whether a different journal selection 
would yield similar patterns on geographical concentration and the experiments' quality 
proxies. Despite the focus on three journals, we think that our results are noteworthy 
considering the ex ante and ex post quality differences between experiments conducted in North 
America and Europe. 
Second, for the collection of citation data we used Web of Science. Since Web of Science has 
not indexed all journals and literature sources, the citations of Web of Science deviate from 
citation counts by other platforms, e.g. Google Scholar39. For our data set, we can therefore not 
claim to have recorded all citations received by a paper in the years after its publication, or to 
have recorded all citations received by a single author in the 5 years prior publication of the 
respective paper. However, we do not regard this incomplete recording of citations as 
problematic. While it can be expected to introduce a level effect, it should not yield any 
systematic misrepresentations between authors.  
Third, when testing for editorial favoritism, our data set contains only a small number of 
laboratory experiments published in the AER. This implies that our results must be interpreted 
with caution. Though our findings are compatible with the existence of editorial favoritism, 
they do not prove its existence (see section 6.5). Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that 
our results, which are based exclusively on papers reporting results from laboratory 
experiments, can be transferred to other subfields of economics. In addition, in our test for 
editorial favoritism, we assume that editors have the primary goal of maximizing the impact 
factor of their journal and, thus, the number of citations that the published papers receive. 
However, we can neither be sure that this assumption is correct nor that other quality 
characteristics, such as relevance for policy-making or expected media coverage, do not play a 
stronger role in the selection of papers. 
Fourth, our regressions in section 6 only include papers published before 2014. Thus, even if 
editorial favoritism and gender effects actually existed up to that year, we cannot say if these 
problems still persist in more recent years. 
                                                     
39 See Hamermesh (2018) for a detailed analysis of the relation between Web of Science and Google Scholar 
citations.  
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Finally, it should be noted that we only recorded authors’ affiliations at the time of publication. 
Hence, we could not capture any social ties that existed due to previous employment, research, 
or study stays. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we examined geographical concentration, compared objectively measurable 
quality proxies, and tested for editorial favoritism in experimental economics.  
We found that geographical concentration decreased. More precisely, the US's share in research 
output decreased from 66% to 37% while the shares of several European countries (Germany, 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK) and Australia increased. This is in line with other 
studies (Ek and Henrekson 2019, Kocher and Sutter 2001) that, although not focusing on any 
particular field, also report a decreasing US dominance across fields. 
Looking more closely into the papers, we examine if four ex ante proxies for the quality of the 
experiments (total number of participants, participants per treatment, number of treatments, 
and strength of monetary incentives) differ between journals.  
Comparing experiments conducted in North America and Europe, there are no differences 
regarding the number of treatments and no or only small differences regarding the strength of 
monetary incentives. However, European experiments rely on a significantly larger total 
number of participants and a significantly larger number of participants per treatment. This 
holds for all journals, but the difference is most pronounced for the AER where, on average, 
experiments conducted in North America have 55 participants per treatment while experiments 
conducted in Europe have 109 participants per treatment. 
The differences in the total number of participants and participants per treatment could reflect 
different methodological standards. However, they could also indicate substantial barriers to 
entry for European economists, especially for the AER, where the North American dominance 
is more pronounced in the composition of the editorial board. 
Analyzing the number of citations papers receive in the 5 and 10 years after publication, we 
find that experiments conducted in Europe receive more citations compared to experiments 
conducted in North America. The differences are statistically significant and large, except for 
papers published in the JEEA, possibly because of the small number of observations for this 
journal. In the 10 years after publication, North American AER papers receive, on average, 61 
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citations while European AER papers receive, on average, 124 citations. For Exp Econ, the 
corresponding numbers are 14 and 34. 
Finally, we test for editorial favoritism. Editorial favoritism means that social ties (here: a vast 
majority of members of the editorial board and a positive share of authors having a US 
affiliation) have a negative effect on the quality of the published papers. We focus on the AER 
where almost all members of the editorial board are affiliated with US universities.  
Our data provide some indications of editorial favoritism for the AER: papers authored by 
economists with a social tie to the editorial board receive between 12 (54) and 26 (153) fewer 
citations in the 5 (10) years after publication compared to papers authored by economists 
without a social tie to the editorial board. Due to the higher number of experimental economists 
in Europe, network effects may, at least partly, be driving these results. Nevertheless, network 
effects do not seem to provide the whole explanation, since a positive share of US-affiliated 
authors of a paper has no negative effect on the citation counts of Exp Econ and JEEA papers. 
For AER papers, we only find small or null effects of the experiment's quality proxies on 
citations. This could be due to the small number of observations. The number of references and 
the authors’ reputation have a positive effect on citations in the 5 years but no effect on citations 
in the 10 subsequent years after publication. For Exp Econ papers, we find that the number of 
pages has a negative effect and that the number of references a positive effect on citations in 
the 5 and 10 years after publication. Further, for Exp Econ papers, our results show that authors’ 
reputation has a positive effect on the number of citations only in the first 5 years after 
publication. 
For the AER and the JEEA we find evidence that the share of female authors has a significantly 
positive effect on the number of citations in the 5 years after publication.  
As a concluding remark: we find that about one third of the papers reported incomplete 
information about their experimental procedures. In view of the replication crisis in social 
sciences, this is of particular concern since only a well-documented experiment can be 
replicated. In addition, the statistical processing of individual results in meta-studies is 
hampered if, for example, it is not clear how many persons participated in an experiment. Future 
research would benefit from clearly defined standards that specify which characteristics of a 
laboratory experiment should be reported in a paper. 
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Appendix 
A. Geographical Concentration and Gender Effects 
  
Shares 
Scores 
AER Exp Econ JEEA All three 
Argentinia 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.17 
 2.73 0.00 0.00 2.73 
Australia 2.26 3.80 2.07 3.10 
 12.37 33.62 3.32 49.31 
Austria 2.63 4.86 0.00 3.60 
 14.35 42.99 0.00 57.34 
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.29 0.00 1.29 
Belgium 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 
 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.60 
Canada 1.79 2.71 1.53 2.27 
 9.76 23.98 2.44 36.19 
China 2.47 1.07 0.00 1.44 
 13.48 9.42 0.00 22.90 
Colombia 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.16 
 0.00 2.54 0.00 2.54 
Czech Republic 0.30 0.12 0.00 0.17 
 1.66 1.07 0.00 2.73 
Denmark 0.18 0.65 0.00 0.42 
 0.97 5.76 0.00 6.72 
Finland 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 
 0.00 1.13 0.00 1.13 
France 0.65 3.03 2.94 2.20 
 3.53 26.80 4.69 35.03 
Germany 4.41 12.08 13.29 9.57 
 24.09 106.85 21.24 152.19 
Guatemala 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.09 
 0.00 1.42 0.00 1.42 
India 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.16 
 0.00 2.62 0.00 2.62 
Israel 1.48 0.84 0.00 0.98 
 8.12 7.46 0.00 15.58 
Italy 0.39 3.50 1.55 2.24 
 2.15 30.95 2.47 35.57 
Japan 0.27 1.21 0.00 0.77 
 1.49 10.74 0.00 12.23 
Latvia 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 
 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.11 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.06 
 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.92 
Mexico 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.11 
 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.69 
Netherlands 3.30 4.68 7.35 4.47 
 18.01 41.36 11.75 71.12 
New Zealand 0.15 1.19 0.00 0.71 
 0.80 10.54 0.00 11.34 
Norway 0.54 0.68 6.31 1.20 
 2.94 6.00 10.09 19.03 
Portugal 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.25 
 0.00 4.01 0.00 4.01 
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Russia 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.28 
Singapore 0.50 0.80 0.00 0.62 
 2.73 7.06 0.00 9.79 
South Korea 0.08 0.18 2.65 0.39 
 0.46 1.59 4.23 6.28 
Spain 2.68 5.88 2.04 4.40 
 14.64 52.05 3.26 69.95 
Sweden 0.71 1.25 0.00 0.94 
 3.89 11.06 0.00 14.95 
Switzerland 5.01 2.24 20.05 4.98 
 27.39 19.85 32.05 79.29 
Taiwan 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.14 
 0.00 2.18 0.00 2.18 
Turkey 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.15 
 1.61 0.81 0.00 2.42 
UK 6.08 8.80 9.50 7.94 
 33.24 77.89 15.18 126.32 
US 63.33 37.84 29.58 45.77 
 346.12 334.79 47.27 728.18 
UAE 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 1.27 0.00 1.27 
Uruguay 0.00 0.00 1.15 0.12 
 0.00 0.00 1.83 1.83 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 546.55 884.70 159.82 1591.08 
Table 15: Countries' shares and scores, all countries, pooled data from 1998 to 2018 for the AER, from 1999 to 
2018 for Exp Econ and from 2011 to 2018 for the JEEA. 
  
48 
 
 
Shares 
Scores 
1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 2014-2018 1999-2018 
Argentinia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.19 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.73 2.73 
Australia 0.65 1.39 3.31 5.03 3.20 
 0.71 3.94 20.12 21.23 46.00 
Austria 0.61 0.12 6.53 3.94 3.99 
 0.67 0.34 39.71 16.63 57.34 
Azerbaijan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.29 1.29 
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.04 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.60 
Canada 1.55 0.87 2.91 2.81 2.37 
 1.68 2.46 17.72 11.89 34.07 
China 1.19 1.04 0.37 3.89 1.59 
 1.29 2.95 2.23 16.42 22.90 
Colombia 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.45 0.18 
 0.00 0.00 0.64 1.90 2.54 
Czech Republic 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.25 0.19 
 0.00 1.66 0.00 1.07 2.73 
Denmark 0.00 0.14 0.26 1.11 0.47 
 0.00 0.41 1.61 4.71 6.72 
Finland 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.08 
 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.85 1.13 
France 2.93 0.19 2.51 2.68 2.11 
 3.18 0.55 15.27 11.33 30.33 
Germany 4.66 5.46 9.50 12.47 9.13 
 5.06 15.43 57.80 52.66 131.28 
Guatemala 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.10 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.42 1.42 
India 0.00 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.18 
 0.00 0.65 1.11 0.86 2.62 
Israel 1.05 0.77 1.72 0.43 1.15 
 1.13 2.18 10.44 1.82 16.58 
Italy 0.60 1.22 2.94 2.63 2.34 
 0.65 3.44 17.91 11.09 33.60 
Japan 0.60 1.08 0.55 1.22 0.85 
 0.65 3.07 3.36 5.16 12.23 
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.08 
 0.00 0.00 1.11 0.00 1.11 
Luxembourg 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.06 
 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.00 0.92 
Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.12 
 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.83 1.69 
Netherlands 2.27 4.15 3.67 5.42 4.13 
 2.46 11.73 22.30 22.88 59.38 
New Zealand 1.63 0.16 1.10 0.57 0.79 
 1.77 0.45 6.72 2.40 11.34 
Norway 0.00 1.04 0.00 1.42 0.62 
 0.00 2.94 0.00 6.00 8.94 
Portugal 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.66 0.28 
 0.00 0.00 1.23 2.78 4.01 
Russia 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 1.28 0.00 1.28 
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.36 1.81 0.68 
 0.00 0.00 2.16 7.63 9.79 
South Korea 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.14 
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 0.00 0.00 1.59 0.00 2.05 
Spain 1.66 2.77 8.13 1.80 4.66 
 1.80 7.85 49.46 7.59 67.02 
Sweden 0.99 1.68 0.23 1.84 1.04 
 1.07 4.74 1.37 7.76 14.95 
Switzerland 8.96 1.29 4.31 1.81 3.28 
 9.72 3.64 26.24 7.64 47.24 
Taiwan 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.20 0.15 
 0.00 1.34 0.00 0.83 2.18 
Turkey 1.48 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.17 
 1.61 0.00 0.81 0.00 2.42 
UK 3.00 6.45 8.86 8.46 7.83 
 3.25 18.24 53.93 35.72 112.64 
US 65.92 68.88 41.17 36.79 47.55 
 71.52 194.84 250.48 155.38 683.91 
UAE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.09 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.27 1.27 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 108.50 282.86 608.36 422.38 1438.26 
Table 16: Development of geographical concentration of AER and Exp Econ authors for all countries, data pooled 
over different periods. For each country, the first row reports the country's share and the second row reports the 
country's score. 
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Country I: Score 
II: Pop. (in 
1000) 
III: 
𝑰
𝑰𝑰
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔  IV: Score 
V: Pop. (in 
1000) 
VI: 
𝑰𝑽
𝑽
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔  
Period 1999–2003 1999  2004-2008 2004  
Argentinia 0.00 36,648.1 0.00 0.00 38,728.7 0.00 
Australia 0.71 18,926.0 0.04 3.94 20,127.4 0.20 
Austria 0.67 7,992.3 0.08 0.34 8,172.0 0.04 
Azerbaijan 0.00 7,982.8 0.00 0.00 8,306.5 0.00 
Belgium 0.00 10,226.4 0.00 0.00 10,421.1 0.00 
Canada 1.68 30,499.2 0.05 2.46 31,995.0 0.08 
China 1.29 1,252,735.0 0.00 2.95 1,296,075.0 0.00 
Colombia 0.00 39,819.3 0.00 0.00 42,724.2 0.00 
Czech Rep. 0.00 10,283.9 0.00 1.66 10,197.1 0.16 
Denmark 0.00 5,321.8 0.00 0.41 5,404.5 0.08 
Finland 0.28 5,165.5 0.05 0.00 5,228.2 0.00 
France 3.18 60,496.7 0.05 0.55 62,704.9 0.01 
Germany 5.06 82,100.2 0.06 15.43 82,516.3 0.19 
Guatemala 0.00 11,387.2 0.00 0.00 12,796.9 0.00 
India 0.00 1,034,539.2 0.00 0.65 1,126,135.8 0.00 
Israel 1.13 6,125.0 0.19 2.18 6,809.0 0.32 
Italy 0.65 56,916.3 0.01 3.44 57,685.3 0.06 
Japan 0.65 126,631.0 0.01 3.07 127,761.0 0.02 
Latvia 0.00 2,390.5 0.00 0.00 2,263.1 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.00 430.5 0.00 0.00 458.1 0.00 
Mexico 0.00 100,300.6 0.00 0.00 106,995.6 0.00 
Netherlands 2.46 15,812.1 0.16 11.73 16,281.8 0.72 
New Zealand 1.77 3,835.1 0.46 0.45 4,087.5 0.11 
Norway 0.00 4,461.9 0.00 2.94 4,591.9 0.64 
Portugal 0.00 10,217.8 0.00 0.00 10,483.9 0.00 
Russia 0.00 147,214.4 0.00 0.00 144,067.1 0.00 
Singapore 0.00 3,958.7 0.00 0.00 4,166.7 0.00 
South Korea 0.00 46,616.7 0.00 0.00 48,082.5 0.00 
Spain 1.80 40,386.9 0.04 7.85 42,921.9 0.18 
Sweden 1.07 8,857.9 0.12 4.74 8,993.5 0.53 
Switzerland 9.72 7,144.9 1.36 3.64 7,389.6 0.49 
Taiwan 0.00 21,712.0 0.00 1.34 22,462.0 0.06 
Turkey 1.61 62,287.3 0.03 0.00 67,007.9 0.00 
UK 3.25 58,682.5 0.06 18.24 59,987.9 0.30 
US 71.52 279,040.0 0.26 194.84 292,805.3 0.67 
UAE 0.00 2,988.2 0.00 0.00 4,087.9 0.00 
Total 108.50   282.86   
Table 17: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and Exp Econ authors per one million inhabitants. 
Data pooled for periods 1999-2003 and 2004-2008. 
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Country I: Score 
II: Pop. (in 
1000) 
III: 
𝑰
𝑰𝑰
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔 IV: Score 
V: Pop. (in 
1000) 
VI: 
𝑰𝑽
𝑽
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟔 
 Period 2009-2013 2009  2014-2018 2014  
Argentinia 0.00 40,799.4 0.00 2.73 42,981.5 0.06 
Australia 20.12 21,691.7 0.93 21.23 23,475.7 0.90 
Austria 39.71 8,343.3 4.76 16.63 8,546.4 1.95 
Azerbaijan 0.00 8,947.2 0.00 1.29 9,535.1 0.14 
Belgium 0.00 10,796.5 0.00 0.60 11,209.1 0.05 
Canada 17.72 33,628.6 0.53 11.89 35,535.3 0.33 
China 2.23 1,331,260.0 0.00 16.42 1,364,270.0 0.01 
Colombia 0.64 45,416.2 0.01 1.90 47,791.9 0.04 
Czech Rep. 0.00 10,443.9 0.00 1.07 10,525.3 0.10 
Denmark 1.61 5,523.1 0.29 4.71 5,643.5 0.83 
Finland 0.00 5,338.9 0.00 0.85 5,461.5 0.16 
France 15.27 64,707.0 0.24 11.33 66,316.1 0.17 
Germany 57.80 81,902.3 0.71 52.66 80,982.5 0.65 
Guatemala 0.00 14,316.12 0.00 1.42 15,923.6 0.09 
India 1.11 1,214,270.1 0.00 0.86 1,293,859.3 0.00 
Israel 10.44 7,485.6 1.39 1.82 8,215.7 0.22 
Italy 17.91 59,095.4 0.30 11.09 60,789.1 0.18 
Japan 3.36 128,047.0 0.03 5.16 127,276.0 0.04 
Latvia 1.11 2,141.7 0.52 0.00 1,993.8 0.00 
Luxembourg 0.92 497.8 1.85 0.00 556.3 0.00 
Mexico 0.85 115,505.2 0.01 0.83 124,221.6 0.01 
Netherlands 22.30 16,530.4 1.35 22.88 16,865.0 1.36 
New Zealand 6.72 4,302.6 1.56 2.40 4,509.7 0.53 
Norway 0.00 4,828.7 0.00 6.00 5,137.2 1.17 
Portugal 1.23 10,568.2 0.12 2.78 10,401.1 0.27 
Russia 1.28 142,785.3 0.01 0.00 143,819.7 0.00 
Singapore 2.16 4,987.6 0.43 7.63 5,469.7 1.40 
South Korea 1.59 49,307.8 0.03 0.00 50,746.7 0.00 
Spain 49.46 46,362.9 1.07 7.59 46,480.9 0.16 
Sweden 1.37 9,298.5 0.15 7.76 9,696.1 0.80 
Switzerland 26.24 7,743.8 3.39 7.64 8,188.7 0.93 
Taiwan 0.00 23,017.0 0.00 0.83 23,414.0 0.04 
Turkey 0.81 71,339.2 0.01 0.00 77,030.7 0.00 
UK 53.93 62,276.3 0.87 35.72 64,613.2 0.55 
US 250.48 306,771.5 0.82 155.38 318,386.4 0.49 
UAE 0.00 7,666.4 0.00 1.27 9,070.9 0.14 
Total 608.36   422.38   
Table 18: Scores for the geographical concentration of AER and Exp Econ authors per one million inhabitants. 
Data pooled for periods 2009-2013 and 2014-2018. 
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Figure 3: Development of the relative share of female authors among the three journals. 
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B. Citations, Quality Proxies and Editorial Favoritism 
period P1: # total 
participants 
North America Europe both regions p-value 
1
9
9
9
 -
 2
0
0
3
 
AER 240.62 
(159.08) 
𝑁 = 21 
230.00 
(124.78) 
𝑁 = 10 
237.19 
(146.86) 
𝑁 = 31 
0.9834 
Exp Econ 134.15 
(75.65) 
𝑁 = 41 
154.85 
(99.97) 
𝑁 = 34 
143.53 
(87.51) 
𝑁 = 75 
0.3522 
 
 
both 170.21 
(120.96) 
𝑁 = 62 
171.93 
(109.29) 
𝑁 = 44 
170.92 
(115.72) 
𝑁 = 106 
0.7147 
2
0
0
4
 -
 2
0
0
8
 
AER 201.16 
(181.19) 
𝑁 = 25 
432.71 
(294.28) 
𝑁 = 7 
251.81 
(227.24) 
𝑁 = 32 
0.0152 
Exp Econ 138.66 
(72.10) 
𝑁 = 35 
130.52 
(104.34) 
𝑁 = 21 
135.61 
(84.79) 
𝑁 = 56 
0.2332 
both 164.70 
(131.59) 
𝑁 = 60 
206.07 
(212.29) 
𝑁 = 28 
177.86 
(161.57) 
𝑁 = 88 
0.8814 
2
0
0
9
 -
 2
0
1
3
 
AER 263.95 
(171.46) 
𝑁 = 21 
387.82 
(249.52) 
𝑁 = 17 
319.37 
(216.13) 
𝑁 = 38 
0.1020 
Exp Econ 162.86 
(79.42) 
𝑁 = 28 
217.24 
(129.07) 
𝑁 = 49 
197.47 
(116.00) 
𝑁 = 77 
0.0376 
both 206.18 
(135.47) 
𝑁 = 49 
261.18 
(182.42) 
𝑁 = 66 
237.75 
(165.67) 
𝑁 = 115 
0.0364 
2
0
1
4
 -
 2
0
1
8
 
AER 124.44 
(51.06) 
𝑁 = 9 
437.60 
(371.08) 
𝑁 = 5 
236.29 
(261.19) 
𝑁 = 14 
0.1049 
Exp Econ 210.77 
(110.08) 
𝑁 = 62 
245.89 
(126.28) 
𝑁 = 65 
228.75 
(119.49) 
𝑁 = 127 
0.0897 
both 199.83 
(108.14) 
𝑁 = 71 
259.59 
(158.89) 
𝑁 = 70 
229.50 
(138.53) 
𝑁 = 141 
0.0145 
Table 19: Mean values, standard deviations (in parentheses), and number of observations for number of total 
participants by period, region, and journal. The last column shows the p-value from a two-sided Mann-Whitney 
test. 
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Figure 4: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for AER authors and experiments 
conducted in North America or Europe. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of citations received 5 years prior publication, for Exp Econ authors and experiments 
conducted in North America or Europe. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) 
Constant 3.42*** 3.83*** 3.85*** 5.18*** 6.34*** 7.37*** 
 (0.40) (0.60) (0.66) (0.59) (1.03) (1.05) 
       
ST -0.49** -0.82*** -0.83*** -0.81** -1.02** -1.49*** 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.27) (0.32) (0.47) (0.45) 
       
Fem 0.48 0.65 0.66 0.35 -0.03 -0.11 
 (0.30) (0.40) (0.41) (0.47) (0.99) (1.02) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.00   -0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2   -0.00   -0.00* 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
       
P3   -0.03   -0.16 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.10) 
       
P4  0.28 0.31  0.33 -0.02 
(incentives)  (0.40) (0.41)  (0.52) (0.51) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.00 0.01 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P7 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 -0.05 -0.16 -0.16 -0.03 -0.32 -0.35* 
(authors) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.24) (0.19) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -0.74** -0.35 -0.29 -0.96** -0.62 -0.64 
 (0.29) (0.50) (0.57) (0.37) (0.70) (0.76) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.21 
Table 20: Tobit regressions of asinh(c5) and asinh(c10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), 
and papers' and experiments' quality proxies. AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) 
Constant 2.81*** 3.14*** 3.19*** 4.52*** 5.64*** 6.64*** 
 (0.37) (0.56) (0.61) (0.56) (1.00) (1.02) 
       
ST -0.45** -0.75*** -0.77*** -0.78** -1.00** -1.46*** 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.26) (0.31) (0.46) (0.43) 
       
Fem 0.46* 0.60 0.62 0.36 -0.03 -0.12 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.38) (0.44) (0.97) (0.99) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.00   -0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2   -0.00   -0.00* 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
       
P3   -0.03   -0.16 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.09) 
       
P4  0.26 0.28  0.32 -0.01 
(incentives)  (0.37) (0.38)  (0.51) (0.49) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.00 0.01 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P7 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01** 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 -0.05 -0.15 -0.15 -0.03 -0.31 -0.34* 
(authors) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.23) (0.19) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -0.69** -0.28 -0.22 -0.95*** -0.59 -0.62 
 (0.27) (0.47) (0.53) (0.35) (0.68) (0.74) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.21 
Table 21: Tobit regressions of log(1+c5) and log(1+c10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), 
and papers' and experiments' quality proxies. AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 17.15* 32.39* 37.30* 123.91*** 173.22** 193.58** 
 (9.85) (18.53) (20.15) (41.25) (73.92) (79.76) 
       
North America -6.98* -21.44*** -23.16*** -23.63 -59.51* -75.44** 
 (4.15) (7.01) (7.29) (18.53) (28.30) (29.13) 
       
Fem 13.66* 27.93** 29.25** 15.73 -28.40 -25.91 
 (8.16) (13.39) (13.64) (37.81) (85.14) (97.23) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.01   0.01  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.02)   (0.08)  
       
P2    -0.03   -0.14 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.03)   (0.11) 
       
P3   -0.94   -4.56 
(treatments)   (1.35)   (9.52) 
       
P4  -2.60 -3.42  21.79 19.00 
(incentives)  (13.01) (13.38)  (43.85) (45.52) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.28 -0.15 -0.05 -1.88 -0.31 0.61 
(pages) (0.27) (0.43) (0.45) (1.31) (2.60) (3.30) 
       
P6 0.65*** 0.55** 0.53** 0.60 -1.61 -1.58 
(references) (0.16) (0.24) (0.24) (0.81) (1.62) (1.89) 
       
P7 0.02*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.04 0.02 0.11 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.28) (0.32) 
       
P8 -2.08 -4.38 -4.97 -5.20 -9.88 -11.37 
(authors) (2.48) (3.73) (3.87) (10.54) (19.66) (17.58) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -12.30 -2.17 5.31 -71.09** -32.21 -20.16 
 (7.97) (16.27) (18.44) (29.56) (62.10) (70.17) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Table 22: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share of female 
authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. AER papers. Standard errors in parentheses: 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) 
Constant 3.08*** 3.63*** 3.73*** 4.50*** 5.56*** 6.15*** 
 (0.37) (0.55) (0.60) (0.53) (0.84) (0.86) 
       
North America -0.24 -0.78*** -0.82*** -0.24 -0.67* -1.00*** 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.32) (0.31) 
       
Fem 0.47 0.92** 0.96** 0.17 -0.27 0.13 
 (0.30) (0.40) (0.41) (0.49) (0.97) (1.04) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2    -0.00   -0.00 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
       
P3   -0.03   -0.22* 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.10) 
       
P4  0.27 0.26  0.53 0.24 
(incentives)  (0.39) (0.40)  (0.50) (0.49) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.02 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P7 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 -0.01 -0.13 -0.13 0.05 -0.21 -0.25 
(authors) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.19) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -0.79*** -0.41 -0.26 -0.96** -0.58 -0.17 
 (0.30) (0.48) (0.55) (0.38) (0.70) (0.75) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.20 
Table 23: Tobit regressions of asinh(c5) and asinh(c10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share 
of female authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. AER papers. Standard errors in 
parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) 
Constant 2.51*** 2.96*** 3.07*** 3.89*** 4.87*** 5.44*** 
 (0.34) (0.51) (0.56) (0.51) (0.82) (0.84) 
       
North America -0.23 -0.72*** -0.76*** -0.24 -0.65* -0.98*** 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23) (0.31) (0.31) 
       
Fem 0.45 0.85** 0.90** 0.18 -0.27 0.12 
 (0.28) (0.37) (0.38) (0.46) (0.94) (1.02) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  -0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2    -0.00   -0.00 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.00) 
       
P3   -0.03   -0.21* 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.10) 
       
P4  0.25 0.23  0.52 0.24 
(incentives)  (0.36 (0.37)  (0.49) (0.48) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.01 0.01 0.02* -0.01 0.02 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P7 0.00** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 -0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.04 -0.21 -0.24 
(authors) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.22) (0.18) 
       
Papers&Proceed. -0.74*** -0.35 -0.19 -0.96** -0.55 -0.15 
 (0.27) (0.45) (0.51) (0.36) (0.69) (0.74) 
N 127 68 66 71 26 25 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.14 0.20 
Table 24: Tobit regressions of log(1+c5) and log(1+c10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share 
of female authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. AER papers. Standard errors in 
parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 c5 c5 c5 c10 c10 c10 
Constant 9.37*** 7.60* 7.28* 33.43** 8.23 -3.64 
 (3.02) (3.88) (4.19) (13.60) (18.35) (18.74) 
       
North America -2.68* -2.93* -2.78* -11.09* -9.37 -10.17 
 (1.50) (1.62) (1.61) (6.29) (8.03) (7.51) 
       
Fem -1.40 -1.17 -2.09 -3.11 8.44 -3.09 
 (2.63) (2.83) (2.89) (11.95) (14.86) (14.51) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.00   0.08*  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.01)   (0.05)  
       
P2    0.00   0.08 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.02)   (0.15) 
       
P3   0.56   6.77*** 
(treatments)   (0.38)   (2.20) 
       
P4  4.13 2.94  18.55 22.47 
(incentives)  (4.16) (4.20)  (22.62) (21.31) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.46*** -1.19* -1.31* -1.15* 
(pages) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.60) (0.70) (0.66) 
       
P6 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.59** 0.48 0.50 
(references) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.29) (0.35) (0.33) 
       
P7 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03 0.06 0.03 
(reputation) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
       
P8 -0.49 -0.12 -0.33 -1.42 2.81 1.34 
(authors) (0.78) (0.84) (0.84) (3.38) (4.41) (4.12) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 
Table 25: Tobit regressions of c(5) and c(10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share of female 
authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors in 
parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) 
Constant 2.19*** 2.04*** 1.90*** 3.13*** 2.32*** 2.06*** 
 (0.32) (0.44) (0.48) (0.56) (0.68) (0.74) 
       
North America -0.36** -0.34* -0.33* -0.45* -0.55* -0.58* 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26) (0.30) (0.30) 
       
Fem -0.11 -0.17 -0.19 0.23 0.51 0.42 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.33) (0.49) (0.55) (0.57) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2    0.00   0.01 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
       
P3   0.05   0.10 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.09) 
       
P4  0.53 0.48  1.09 1.19 
(incentives)  (0.47) (0.48)  (0.84) (0.84) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05* -0.06** -0.06** 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
P6 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
P7 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.17 0.15 
(authors) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.14 
Table 26: Tobit regressions of asinh(c5) and asinh(c10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share 
of female authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors 
in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) 
Constant 1.76*** 1.62*** 1.51*** 2.59*** 1.85*** 1.61** 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.40) (0.50) (0.61) (0.67) 
       
North America -0.30** -0.29* -0.28* -0.40* -0.47* -0.49* 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27) 
       
Fem -0.10 -0.14 -0.17 0.19 0.46 0.35 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.28) (0.44) (0.50) (0.52) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2    0.00   0.01 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
       
P3   0.04   0.10 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.08) 
       
P4  0.44 0.39  0.94 1.03 
(incentives)  (0.40) (0.40)  (0.76) (0.76) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04* -0.05** -0.05** 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
P7 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.13 
(authors) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.14 
Table 27: Tobit regressions of log(1+c5) and log(1+c10) on place of experimentation (North America), rel. share 
of female authors (Fem), and experiments' and papers' quality characteristics. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors 
in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
63 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) asinh(c10) 
Constant 2.17*** 1.90*** 1.75*** 3.18*** 2.25*** 1.97** 
 (0.32) (0.44) (0.48) (0.58) (0.68) (0.74) 
       
ST -0.29* -0.20 -0.19 -0.47 -0.54 -0.62 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.30) (0.36) (0.37) 
       
Fem -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 0.26 0.68 0.55 
 (0.28) (0.33) (0.33) (0.50) (0.58) (0.59) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2   0.00   0.01 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
       
P3   0.06   0.13 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.09) 
       
P4  0.50 0.45  0.96 1.08 
(incentives)  (0.48) (0.48)  (0.84) (0.84) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05* -0.06** -0.05* 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
       
P6 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03* 0.03* 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
P7 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.17 
(authors) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.13 
Table 28: Tobit regressions of asinh(c5) and asinh(c10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), 
and papers' and experiments' quality proxies. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) log(1+c10) 
Constant 1.74*** 1.51*** 1.39*** 2.64*** 1.78*** 1.52** 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.40) (0.51) (0.62) (0.67) 
       
ST -0.25* -0.17 -0.16 -0.42 -0.44 -0.52 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.27) (0.33) (0.34) 
       
Fem -0.10 -0.11 -0.14 0.22 0.59 0.45 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.28) (0.44) (0.52) (0.53) 
       
Experiment Quality       
P1  0.00   0.00  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)   (0.00)  
       
P2   0.00   0.00 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
       
P3   0.05   0.13 
(treatments)   (0.04)   (0.08) 
       
P4  0.42 0.36  0.82 0.94 
(incentives)  (0.40) (0.41)  (0.76) (0.76) 
       
Paper Quality       
P5 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04* -0.05** -0.05* 
(pages) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
       
P6 0.02*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02* 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
       
P7 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
P8 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.15 
(authors) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 201 138 138 84 50 50 
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.14 
Table 29: Tobit regressions of log(1+c5) and log(1+c10) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), 
and papers' and experiments' quality proxies. Exp Econ papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 asinh(c5) asinh(c5) asinh(c5) 
Constant 3.02*** 1.13 0.45 
 (0.89) (0.82) (1.12) 
    
ST -0.45 -0.10 0.14 
 (0.52) (0.40) (0.56) 
    
Fem 1.27* 1.22** 1.70** 
 (0.60) (0.44) (0.52) 
    
Experiment Quality    
P1  0.00***  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)  
    
P2   0.01** 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00) 
    
P3   0.09 
(treatments)   (0.09) 
    
P4  0.35 -0.02 
(incentives)  (1.27) (1.56) 
    
Paper Quality    
P5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
(pages) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
P6 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
P7 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
P8 -0.15 0.19 0.14 
(authors) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) 
N 21 15 15 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.60 0.44 
Table 30: Tobit regressions of asinh(c5) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), and papers' and 
experiments' quality proxies. JEEA papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 (1) (2) (3) 
 log(1+c5) log(1+c5) log(1+c5) 
Constant 2.45** 0.79 0.17 
 (0.84) (0.77) (1.05) 
    
ST -0.44 -0.07 0.15 
 (0.49) (0.38) (0.53) 
    
Fem 1.22** 1.15** 1.60** 
 (0.56) (0.41) (0.49) 
    
Experiment Quality    
P1  0.00***  
(total nr. of part.)  (0.00)  
    
P2   0.01** 
(part. per treatm.)   (0.00) 
    
P3   0.08 
(treatments)   (0.08) 
    
P4  0.10 -0.25 
(incentives)  (1.19) (1.47) 
    
Paper Quality    
P5 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
(pages) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
    
P6 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
(references) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    
P7 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(reputation) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    
P8 -0.14 0.18 0.13 
(authors) (0.16) (0.13) (0.16) 
N 21 15 15 
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.63 0.46 
Table 31: Tobit regressions of log(1+c5) on social ties (ST), rel. share of female authors (Fem), and papers' and 
experiments' quality proxies. JEEA papers. Standard errors in parentheses: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
